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ABSTRACT 
It is often thought that the ideas of pure procedural 
' jus t ice and of common good are incompatible . Following a 
brief account of this claim in the Introduction, I shall 
rebut i t by arguing that a pure procedure can incorporate 
some common goods . 
Chapter 1 will be an analysis of the idea of pure 
procedural justice . The idea has a component which will 
be called "neutral procedure thesis" . This thesis holds 
that a pure procedure is fair i f i t is independent of 
goods . However, I shall argue that i t is a mistake to 
expel common goods from pure procedural justice on the 
grounds of this thesis . My argument will be founded on 
the dist inction between conception of the good which is 
personal and common good which is shared . A pure 
procedure, I shall contend, must be independent of 
personal conceptions of the good but not the common goods . 
And if so, there is a possibi l i ty for a pure procedure to 
incorporate common goods . 
This possibi l i ty will be insignificant unless there 
are some common goods . For this reason, the task of 
Chapter 2 is to show that there are. I shall argue that 
oommuni tarians mean by “common good" a specific sense 
which is associated with the strong sense of "common" and 
various meanings of "good". This specific sense will help 
us, on the one hand, to draw a dist inct ion between two 
kinds of common goods (namely, the "mediately" and 
"immediately’’ common goods) and, on the other hand, to 
reject some popular views" of common good. I shall 
maintain that both mediately and immediately common goods 
are existing and s t i l l active in modern societ ies . 
Common goods are of utmost importance for us . We 
cannot get rid of them in the sense that they have 
constituted and continue to constitute our se l f - iden t i t y . 
So, in Chapter 3, I shall examine the relat ion between 
common goods and the se l f . My argument will begin with a 
weaker claim that the self is unavoidably situated in and 
deeply affected by the common goods . Then, I shall argue 
further that one's se l f - iden t i ty which is composed of the 
I一identity and the we — identi ty is constituted by them. 
In view of the above arguments , I shall conclude that 
i t is not only possible to incorporate the ideas of pure 
procedural justice and of common good. Rather, since 
common goods are extremely important for us, the 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this essay is to argue for a possibili ty 
of incorporating the ideas of procedural ；justice and of 
common good. However, I shall not inves tigate here how to 
incorporate them because such an issue is admittedly 
important but far more complicated to handle right at this 
moment . 
The ideas of procedural justice and of common good 
represent two polit ical at t i tudes, namely, liberalism and 
communitarianism. I think these names are somewhat 
misleading. They make some people think that they are 
opposing ideologies and that communitarian ism is the 
"of f spring" of communism and socialism.^ But I do not 
think so. Though we think values such as freedom, 
individual rights, democracy and rule of law are the basic 
convict ions of liberalism, communi tarianism by no means 
denies them. Indeed, what communitarians try to do by 
cr i t ic i s ing liberalism is to "repair" it.2 They find that 
there is an excessive atomistic tendency in liberalism. 
This tendency can be repaired, they argue , by grounding 
1
 See for example Elliott 1994. 
2
 Cf. Rosenblum 1989, 1-17. , 
1 
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the l iberal convictions upon a social thesis . That i s , 
these convictions are possible only within a community. 
Their argument is that a community is the upshot of our 
sharing some common goods instead of our voluntary choices 
to form a community. Our being in a community presupposes 
our participation in the common goods underlying that 
community. These common goods are carried down from 
generation to generation by the culture, t radi t ions , 
ins t i tu t ions and values of the community. These bearers 
or carriers of the common goods should be preserved in 
order to sustain the community to which we commonly 
identify ourselves . This communitarian social thesis i s , 
as I understand i t , an antidote to the excessive atomistic 
tendency in liberalism. In light of th i s , 
communi tarianism looks more like an internal critique of 
liberalism than an opposing ideology to i t . 
However, for those l iberals who hold fast to the 
individual rights, such as Rawls and Kymlicka, they would 
ins is t that the government or the basic ins t i tu t ions of 
the society should not endorse or bias any part icular 
concept ion of the good. Likewise, the basic social 
resources should not be distr ibuted in accordance with any 
part icular conception of the good. Distribution of . 
resources thus should be carried out according to a just 
procedure which is untainted by any conception of the 
good. What is behind this claim seems to be that nothing 
J
 See Taylor 1985b, 187-210； for liberal objection to the social 
thesis, see Kymlicka 1989a, 74—99; 1990, 216-30. « 
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can be commonly accepted by all of us (or by all members 
# 
of a society) as good. In short , for l iberals, there is 
no common good at all . They find that the so-called 
common goods are indeed parochial interests or just the 
conceptions of the good of the majority of a society. If 
the government or the procedure of distribution endorses 
any one of these common goods , i t is then endorsing 
parochial interests and hence unjust. It seems to 
l iberals that the idea of common good is contradicting the 
idea of procedural justice . 
I do not think these two ideas are fundamental ly 
contradicting each other . Rather, I think there is a 
certain room in the idea of pure procedural justice for 
the common goods) I shall inquire into this problem in 
the following chapters . 
4
 There are different brands of proceduralism in moral and 
political philosophy： starting from Descartes (who emphasizes the 
method of discovering morality), through Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau 
(who propose different versions of social contract), Kant (who 
explores the transcendental conditions of morality), utilitarians (who 
introduce quantified calculations of moral actions), to the 
contemporary neo-liberal economists (such as Hayek and Friedman who 
emphasize the spontaneous nature of human society and market order), 
the right-based liberals (such as Rawls who emphasizes the procedure 
of constructing the basic principles of distributive justice) and 
Habermas (who investigates the discourse rationality). Cf. Walzer 
1987, 8-12 and Taylor 1993. It is impossible to examine all these 
variants of proceduralism with limited space. Indeed, I shall 
concentrate on Rawls' idea of pure procedural justice (1971)、 
3 
1 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE RECONSIDERED 
In this chapter, I shall argue that Rawl s ' idea of 
pure procedural justice does leave a certain room for the 
idea of common good . The f i r s t section will begin with a 
comparison, based upon Rawls
1
 own, between different kinds 
of procedural justice in order to point out their 
distinguishing features and s imi lar i t ies . As a result of 
this comparison, I shall point out that fairness of a 
dis t r ibut ive procedure is required by the idea of pure 
procedural justice . Secondly, I shall sketch Rawls ' 
original position to see how i t can realize the fairness 
of a distr ibutive procedure . In the third section, I 
shall examine the "neutral procedure thesis" which 
requires a distr ibut ive procedure to be independent of a l l 
kinds of goods . However, I shall argue that a fa i r 
procedure should be independent of personal concept ions of 
the good instead of common goods . Accordingly, I shall 
conclude in the f inal section that pure procedural just ice 
and common goods are compatible. 
4 
T h r e e K i n d s o f P r o c e d u r a l J u s t i c e 
1. ‘Rawls ' central concern is what a just distr ibution of 
the resources among the members of a society i s . It is a 
d i f f i cu l t problem because, for a lot of reasons, we have 
no independent cri terion of ：' just distribution . We always 
dispute whether to dis tribute in accordance with our needs 
or wants , power or ab i l i ty , or some other c r i t e r i a . Even 
if we decide to dis tribute according to our needs, for 
instance , we s t i l l cannot agree upon a cri ter ion of just 
d is t r ibut ion. The reason is s imply that our needs d i f f e r . 
Someone needs goods A while others need goods B ； someone 
needs more while others need less. It is partly because 
our needs are shaped by the circumstances in which each of 
us finds oneself situated dif ferent ly . Even for the same 
person, his needs may vary a lot as his situations di f fer 
among different periods of time. Similar problem occurs 
to other prospective cr i te r ia of just d is t r ibut ion. In 
view of the absence of an independent cr i ter ion, Rawl s 
applies the idea of pure procedural justice to solve the 
problem of just dis t r ibut ion. Now let us recall what pure 
procedural justice i s . 
According to Rawls, there are three kinds of 
procedural just ice, namely, perfect, imperfect and pure 
procedural justice (Rawls 1971 , 85-6) . Rawls i l l u s t r a t e s 
the idea of perfect procedural justice with the case of 
dividing a cake fa i r ly among several persons . Supposing 
that the cri terion of a just result in this case is 
equality in terms of quantity, the fa i res t procedure is 
5 
"to have one man divide the cake and get the last piece, 
the others being a 1lowed their pick before him" (1971, 
8 5). An example of imperfect procedural justice is a 
criminal t r i a l . The just outcome of a criminal t r i a l is 
that wrongdoers should be convicted while innocent people 
should be acquitted. But it is impossible to have a 
perfect t r i a l procedure which necessarily brings about the 
just out come . As a matter of fact, wrongdoers are 
sometimes released by the court while innocent people are 
sometimes convicted. For pure procedural just ice, the 
paradigm case is gambling. In this case, the rules of the 
game (such as the players must bet voluntarily and no 
cheating is allowed) form the procedure of the game . In 
so far as • the procedure of the game is fa i r and is 
actually carried out, the out come distr ibution of money 
among the players , whatever it is , is just . 
In three aspects these three kinds of procedural 
justice d i f fe r . Firs t , for perfect and imperfect 
procedural justice , there are c r i te r ia of just out come 
which are independent of the procedures while there is 
none for pure procedural justice . For the former two, the 
independent c r i te r ia define the just outcomes whereas the 
procedures produce actual outcomes . The just outcomes 
defined by the independent cr i te r ia are our expectations 
only. In principle , the actual outcomes may not match the 
expected outcomes . Secondly, the procedure for perfect 
procedural justice guarantees that the actual out come is 
correct . By "correct" I mean that the actual out come of 
6 
the procedure matches the expected out come defined by the 
independent criterion. But, for imperfect procedural 
just ice, the procedure cannot always guarantee the 
occurrence of a correct or just result . Unlike the former 
two, the procedure of pure procedural justice determines 
the just outcome. It means that i t has two functions： (1) 
i t defines the expected just outcome； and (2) i t produces 
the actual out come . The final aspect of difference among 
the three kinds of procedural justice follows from the 
above two. For perfect and imperfect justice, the 
c r i t e r ia of outcome justice independent of the procedures 
t e l l us the just outcome without actual carrying out the 
procedure . However, the procedure of pure procedural 
justice "must actually be carried out" ( 1971 , 86 )； 
otherwise we cannot know what the just out come is . 
2. Rawls thinks the distribution of social resources 
resembles the case of pure procedural justice because we 
do not have any criterion of just distr ibution. So, in 
order to solve the problem of just distr ibution, we need 
a fa i r procedure of distr ibut ion. This procedure, for 
Rawls , is constituted by a set of basic principles of 
justice . Once these principles are found, any 
distr ibution of resources in a society must be carried out 
in accordance with them. And whatever outcome i t yields 
is regarded as just if the procedure of distribution has 
been actually carried out . But is i t essential that the 
7 
procedure must be fa i r in some sense? What will happen if 
the procedure of pure procedural just ice is unfair? 
I think the fairness of the procedure is the most 
essential feature of pure procedural jus t ice . This will 
become clearer if we compare the relat ions between the 
procedures and outcomes of the three kinds of procedural 
just ice . In perfect procedural jus t ice , there are 
independent c r i t e r i a of outcome jus t ice . If a procedure 
cannot produce the correct result defined by the 
independent c r i te r ion , for example, i t cannot divide a 
cake into equal shares , then i t must be abandoned. In 
other words , the procedure does not jus t i fy the outcome 
but rather is jus t i f i ed by i t . In case of imperfect 
procedural jus t ice , we also have independent c r i t e r i a of 
out come just ice . For example, the cr i te r ion of just 
outcome of a criminal t r i a l is that wrongdoers should be 
convicted while innocent people should be acquitted . 
However, a mis carriage of just ice can also be jus t i f i ed if 
the procedure i t s e l f is fa i r and has actually and 
impartially been carried out. In this case, whether the 
outcome is just and whether i t is justified are separate 
issues . That i s , the outcome, ei ther just or unjust, is 
nonetheless jus t i f i ed by the procedure . For pure 
procedural jus t ice , there is no independent cr i te r ion of 
outcome just ice . An outcome is not only j u s t i f i ed but 
also determined by the procedure, provided that the 
procedure i t s e l f is fa i r and has actually and impart ia l ly 
be e n carried out . Unlike imperfect procedural justice， 
8 
who s e outcome may be jus t i f ied but unjust, the out come of 
pure procedural justice must be jus t i f ied and just at the 
same time. 
In the above comparison, I find two s imilar i t ies 
between imperfect and pure r procedural justice . These 
s imi lar i t ies deserve serious consideration especially when 
we put imperfect and pure procedural justice into 
practice . First , for both kinds of procedural just ice, 
the procedure must be impartially and consistently and, of 
course, actually carried out . (For imperfect procedural 
jus t ice , the procedure does not need to be carried out so 
as to know the just outcome but i t must be carried out so 
as to justify the outcome . For pure procedural justice , 
however, these two dimensions of the outcome, that i s , to 
be known and to be jus t i f ied , depend on the actual 
carrying out of the procedure . ) This is what Rawls calls 
formal justice ( 1971 , 58-9) . A procedure is formally just 
if i t is impartially and consistently carried out, or if 
i t is applied to similar cases similarly. Forma 1 justice 
does not require the procedure i t se l f to be fa i r or jus t . 
In this way, though a social ins t i tu t ion (or a 
dis t r ibut ive procedure) is somehow unjust, i t is s t i l l 
claimed to be a formally just ins t i tu t ion if i t is 
impartially and consistently administered. Hence, i t is 
not surprised to hear about the saying that "bad law is 
s t i l l law" . If bad laws or unfair ins t i tu t ions are 
formally just and therefore jus t i fy their outcomes , then 
there is no legitimate grounds for us to complain against 
9 
their outcomes unless they are not been administered in a 
formally just manner. 
However, formal justice is only the necessary 
condition of both imperfect and pure procedural justice . 
They must comply with another condition that the procedure 
i t se l f must be fa i r . This is their second similar i ty . 
Rawls himself does not make this requirement explicit , but 
there are two reasons for me to believe in th is . On the 
one hand, the essential feature of imperfect procedural 
justice is that i t s outcome is jus t i f ied by the procedure 
while that of pure procedural justice is that the outcome 
is determined by the procedure . Suppose there is a 
procedure which is unfair but nevertheless jus t i f i e s or 
determines i t s outcome because i t is forma 1ly just . I t 
seems highly probable that the members of a society would 
feel such a procedure too arbi trary, perhaps repressive . 
This possibi l i ty deserves practical consideration. If 
this situation occurs , even though the members of the 
society have no legitimate grounds to reject the outcome , 
they seem to have good, perhaps legitimate, grounds to 
urge for a reform of the procedure . This can be 
i l lus t ra ted by the previous example of a criminal t r i a l . 
If a criminal t r i a l has not yet exhibited formal justice , 
that means i t is not treated similarly as many other 
similar cases, then the losing party can appeal 
legitimately to a higher court to overrule i t s outcome . 
But if the t r i a l has been conducted in a formally just 
ma-nner, even if the t r i a l procedure is unfairly designed , 
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the losing party nevertheless has no legitimate grounds to 
appeal against the court 's decision. However, if the 
criminal t r i a l procedure is really unfair, though the 
out come i t yields is always jus t i f ied , the members of a 
society would probably feel i t too repressive and would 
persistently demand the reformation of the criminal 
procedure . Under this practical consideration, i t is very 
important for pure procedural just ice, and for imperfect 
procedural justice as well, to have a fa i r procedure . I 
think Rawls would not fa i l to see this point . 
On the other hand, if Rawls himself did not require 
a fa i r distributive procedure, he would not have designed 
the thought experiment the original position to 
jus t i fy the two principles of just ice. Now another 
question has been brought to the fore: how can a 
dis t r ibut ive procedure be fair? And i t is the time to 
explicate the original position and the two principles of 
justice . 
T h e O r i g i n a l P o s i t i o n 
For Rawls , a distr ibut ive procedure (which is 
constituted by the basic principles of just ice) is fair on 
two conditions . Firs t , the procedure (and i t s underlying 
principles) must be agreed to by al l members of the 
society who are treated as equals. Second, the procedure 
should not be influenced by any conception of the good.^ 
1
 In his recent book, Political Liberalism, Rawls has adjusted 
this idea so that a fair procedure is neutral to all comprehensive 
doctrines. By "comprehensive doctrine" he means the moral, religious 
11 
By "conception of the good" he means a person's own scheme 
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of pursuing a good l i f e . (I shall use the terms 
"conception of the good", "conception of good l i fe" and 
"plan of good life’’ interchangeably. For me, these terms 
make no significant difference . ) Both conditions are 
reflected in the jus t i f ica t ion of his ideal dis tr ibut ive 
procedure (that is，the two principles of justice) through 
‘ the original position . I shall call the second condition 
the "neutral procedure thesis" (NP) . Let us take a closer 
look at the original position now. 
The original position i s a hypothetical s i tuat ion. 
To ar t iculate this , Rawls asks us to imagine that we (or 
our representatives) are invited to the original position 
to choose from a l i s t of principles of justice . The 
chosen principles will be the basic principles regulating 
the distribution of social resources . Since the part ies 
in the original position come from different classes and 
hold different conceptions of the good, in order to 
prevent them from tai loring the principles of justice to 
their own advantages , there is a veil of ignorance to 
block them from the knowledge of their part icular 
si tuations . For example, they are not allowed to know 
their status in society, their natural assets and 
ab i l i t i e s , and the part iculars of their conceptions of the 
or philosophical doctrines, such as utilitarianism and perfectionism, 
which includes conceptions, values and ideals that inform the human 
life (1993, 13). 
•
 2
 This is only a rough characterization. I shall explain it in 
more detail in Chapter 2. , 
• 12 
good as we 11. They can only know certain general 
knowledge , such as the facts that the society is in a 
condition of moderate scarcity and that they are mutually 
disinterested (that is , they are not interested in one 
another ' s interest , neither 'out of envy nor benevolence). 
The parties in the original position are equally situated 
and are assumed to be equal ly rational . Since they are 
rational and are uncertain about their own future after 
the l i f t i ng of the veil of ignorance, Rawls assumes that 
they would apply the Maximin Rule in making decision. By 
this he means that every party in the original position 
would assume himself to be the worst-off in the society, 
and thus would prefer a principle of justice whose worst 
outcome would s t i l l be better than those resulted from 
other principles . In short , they would choose the 
principles which would maintain a best minimum quantity of 
primary goods for the worst~offs. These primary goods are 
rights and l iber t ies , opportunities and powers, income and 
wealth, and self-respect . They are primary because they 
are necessary for advancing all kinds of conceptions of 
the good . Under these considerations , Rawls thinks the 
partj.es would come to an unanimous decision. That is , 
they would choose his Two Principles of Justice： 
(1) Each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive total system of equal basic l iber t ies 
compatible with a similar system of l iberty for a l l . 
(2) Social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are both： (a) to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the 
just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices 
13 
and positions open to al l under conditions of fa i r 
equality of opportunity (Rawls 1971 , 302) .
3 
The f i r s t condition of a fair procedure, that the 
procedure is agreed to by persons who are regarded as 
equals, is accomplished by (1) that the members of the 
society (or their representatives) are "symmetrically 
situated" in the original position so that they are 
represented as equally free and rational persons (1993, 
79); and (2) that the basic principles of justice are 
determined by the agreement among the parties in the 
original position. The second condition, that the 
procedure i s not influenced by any conception of the good 
(that is , NP), is reflected by the veil of ignorance which 
blocks the parties in original position from knowing their 
own conceptions of the good」 
3
 The First Principle is also called the Principle of Greatest 
Equal Liberty whereas the first and second parts of the Second 
Principle are known as the Difference Principle and the Principle of 
Equality of Opportunity respectively (Rawls 1971, 124). In his later 
works, Rawls has made a few changes to the wordings of these two 
principles (See 1993, 5f, 271, 291, 331-4). 
4
 Someone may doubt whether the original position is really 
prevented from the influence of the conceptions of the good. In fact, 
many criticisms about this rather technical problem have been put 
forth so far. For example, Harsanyi 1971 and the papers by R. 
Dworkin, Hare and Nagel in Daniels 1975. We may query whether the 
veil of ignorance is too thick or too thin； whether the list of 
principles to be chosen is exhaustive； whether the primary goods are 
culturally dependent； whether we will apply the maximin rule in 
situation of uncertainty and so on. But by now I am not in te res ted in 
these technicalities of the original position. I assume for the 
present moment that the veil of ignorance is a sufficient device to 
fence off the conceptions of the good and that the original position 
is more or less neutral and hence fair. 
礞令 
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P e r s o n a l G o o d s a n d Common G o o d s 
1. It is important to note that NP requires the 
dis tr ibut ive procedure to be neutral towards conceptions 
of the good only, which are personal (or private) by-
definit ion . It does not require the procedure to be 
neutral towards all kinds of goods . It is right at this 
point that there is some room for placing a common good in 
a pure procedure . To explicate this point, I need to 
digress a l i t t l e bit to make a dist inction between 
conception of the good (that is , personal good) and 
commonly held good. The la t te r is usually called "common 
good" . But i t should be careful that common goods are 
commonly he ld goods wh i l e t he r e v e r s e may not be the c a s e . 
It depends on the meaning of "common good", and this will 
be c lar i f ied in the next chapter. By the time the term is 
used loosely. 
As many ethical theorists , Rawls c lass i f ies a l l 
values into two categories , the right and the good . 
Just ice is subsumed under the right while al l other values 
are under the good. But obviously there are many kinds of 
goods, for example, benevolence, sol idar i ty , worship of 
God and counting blades of grass as a form of l i f e」 For 
Rawls, who is followed by many l iberals , a l l of these are 
conceptions of the good. However, they can be classif ied 
into two classes: personal conception of good and commonly 
held good. Only the last one is a personal or private 
pursuit of one's own good way of l i f e or goal. The rest 
5
 I borrow this last example from Rawls 1971, 432. , 
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are values or goods commonly held by many of us. They are 
not personal goals at a l l . So, i t is a mis take if one 
t reats these commonly held goods as personal conceptions 
of the good. Of course, on the other hand, those commonly 
held goods, though shared by many persons, may not be 
shared by al l members of society. And it is because of 
th is , commonly held goods may not be common goods . 
With this distinction in mind, one may ask： i f there 
are common goods held commonly by all members of a 
society, is i t necessary to fence them off from the 
procedure of distr ibuting resources of this society? My 
answer is : no. Especially when these common goods are 
very important for the society, like the religious belief 
in the pre-modern Christian European societies and the 
family value in the Confucian society of ancient China . 
2. Preserving a place for common goods in a dis tr ibut ive 
procedure does not contradict the idea of a neutral 
procedure . First of a l l , i t does not contradict NP 
l i t e r a l l y . It is because what NP requires is that the 
distr ibut ive procedure needs to be neutral towards 
personal conceptions of the good instead of al l kinds of 
goods . 
Second, my claim does not contradict the motivation 
behind NP . Such a motivation is primarily to prevent a 
procedure from being dominated by any conception of the 
good. It is because a conception of the good is by 
definit ion a personal or private pursuit . At best, a 
16 
conception of the good may be held by the majority of a 
society but i t nevertheless represents the partisan 
in te res t only. If a procedure is so dominated, i t is 
manipulated by the people who hold the dominating 
conception of the good, and i t subjects others to the 
domination of the partisan in teres t . However, since 
common goods are accepted by al l members of a society and 
are not personal conceptions of the good, so a 1lowing a 
procedure be influenced to some extent by these common 
goods would not violate this motivation. 
Finally, i t seems to me that Rawls' own characteri-
zat ions of a neutral procedure do not reject the import of 
common goods . For Rawls, a d is t r ibut ive procedure is 
neutral not in the sense that i t "use[s] no ideas of the 
good at al l except ones that are purely instrumental’' 
(1993， 191n22) . The two principles of just ice , he 
asser ts , "are substantive and express far more than 
procedural values [such as impart ial i ty, consistency, and 
equal opportunity for the contending par t ies to present 
their claims ]" ( 1993， 192) . But what are the values 
expressed by two principles of just ice besides the 
procedural ones ? Rawls seems to mean： (1) those "values 
that underlie the principles of free rat ional discussion 
between reasonable persons" ( 1993 , 191-2) ； and (2) the 
"fundamental in tu i t ive ideas implicit in the public 
po l i t i ca l culture" which help to const i tute a "public 
basis" or "common ground" of the j u s t i f i c a t i on of basic 
social ins t i tu t ions (1993, 192). These characterizations 
瘃， 
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are vague. But because of this vagueness, there is a 
certain space for importing common goods into a pure 
procedure . To this end I now turn. . 
T h e Good, i n t h e P r o c e d u r e 
1. If NP does not require a procedure to be neutral 
towards al l kinds of goods, then i t seems to be possible 
that the idea of pure procedural justice is compatible 
with the idea of common good, provided that if there are 
common goods at a l l . In order to make clear this 
possibi l i ty , let us consider two examples . The f i r s t is 
of a closed s o c i e t y / be this a pr e-modern Christian 
European society or a Confucian society of the ancient 
China . The members of this society were commonly holding 
an idea of the good, say, the worship of God or the 
respect of the family. It is not d i f f i cu l t to imagine 
that the basic principles of distr ibution of this society 
was influenced by this idea of the good. For the members 
of this society, however, the procedure of dis tr ibut ion 
would not be unfair. This procedure sa t i s f ied the two 
conditions of a fair procedure . Firs t , i t was agreed to 
by al l members of the society. To put i t the other way 
round, if they were really sharing the same idea of the 
good, there was no reason for us to believe that they 
would not agree to the procedure . Second, i t was not 
influenced by any personal conception of the good. 
(
I t is a "closed" society so that we may avoid the complexity of 
comparing the different goods held by other societies and the impact 
of these goods on the society in question. • 
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According to the idea of pure procedural . just ice, in so 
far as the basic principles of this society were actually 
complied with and were formally just, the out come of the 
dis tr ibut ion, whatever i t was , was jus t i f ied by the 
distr ibut ive procedure . 
One may ask： if a distr ibutive procedure is 
influenced by an idea of the good, since the 
distinguishing characterist ic of pure procedural justice 
is the absence of independent cri terion of outcome 
justice , is i t s t i l l a pure procedure? This query may be 
replied by distinguishing "having a good incorporated in 
a procedure" from "having a criterion of distr ibution". 
2. This distinction may be i l lus t ra ted by considering 
another example, a modification of the paradigm case of 
gambling. Supposing that the players are participating in 
a charity function. And they all agree that , as a rule of 
their game, two thirds of the pay-off of the winner, who 
wins most money from the game, shall go into the charity 
fund after the game . Once this rule is applied, there is 
a possibi l i ty that the winner will turn out to be the 
loser, who gains least from the game . But no one will 
complain on any jus t i f i ab le grounds that this rule of the 
game is unfair because they have already accepted the rule 
in advance . And according to the idea of pure procedural 
jus t ice , the end result is just and jus t i f ied anyway. In 
this example, the game is influenced by the good of 
benevolence which may be regarded as the good commonly 
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held by al l players of the game . This underlying good of 
the game, similar to the procedure, jus t i f i es the out come 
of the game . But this does not mean that the good is the 
cri ter ion of the outcome justice . Rather, the just 
out come of the game s t i l l depends on the actual carrying 
out of the procedure. In fact , the good incorporated in 
the procedure is only a part of the procedure . I t , at 
most, points to a direction of a just dis t r ibut ion. It 
cannot therefore become the criterion of out come justice 
or replace the procedure . Once this dist inct ion has been 
made, the incorporation of a good in a pure procedure 
should not be seen as changing the character of the l a t t e r 
to a non-pure one . And the possibi l i ty of incorporating 
pure procedural justice with common goods remains open. 
If a pure procedure may incorporate with common 
goods , what is the theoretical implication? Taking Rawls ' 
theory as an example. I think if the dis tr ibut ive 
procedure, the two principles of just ice, may incorporate 
with some common goods, then i t seems to be a mi stake to 
exclude al l common goods in the original position. In 
light of this , the specification of the veil of ignorance 
should be revised so as to al low the part ies in the 
original position to know the underlying common goods of 
their society. The details of how to revise the 
specification will not be discussed here . 
3. One would object that my argument has considered 
examples of past societies which may either be unpractical 
20 
or nostalgic. It may be true that in past societies there 
are underlying common goods . But i t is apparently not 
appropriate to arrange modern societies in this way. This 
is s imply a wrong way of social arrangement because the 
so-called common goods are only the conceptions of the 
good of the majority of a society. I think this objection 
depends on the assumption that there is no common good in 
modern societies . I shall reply this objection by taking 
up the question whether there is any common good in modern 
societies in Chapter 2. 
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WHAT IS COMMON GOOD? 
I shall argue in this chapter that there are common 
goods in modern societies .^  Before considering this 
question, we must clar ify the meaning of the term "common 
good". This will be done in the f i r s t four sections . The 
f i r s t section will be a sketch of five popular views of 
common good which will be scrutinized later . Next, the 
weak sense and the strong sense of "common" will be 
distinguished in the second section. Then, in the third 
section, I shall argue for a diversity of understandings 
of the good. The fourth section will concentrate on the 
evaluative dimension of the good . I shall argue that to 
neglect this dimension and to define the good in terms of 
desire alone would undermine our capability of evaluating 
conceptions of good l i f e . In the final section, a 
dist inct ion between two kinds of common goods, namely, the 
1
 This relates to the question whether a society should be 
understood as community. Communitarians intend to distinguish 
"society" from "community" (see Sandel 1982, 147-54； Taylor 1985b, 
187-210). In this essay, I shall not attempt to answer the latter 
question nor use the two words in their strict senses. Rather I use 
them interchangeably. . 
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"mediately" and "immediately" common goods, will be 
9 . . . 
drawn. Based upon this dist inction, the five popular 
views of common good will be rejected. And I shall 
conclude that there are some common goods which are 
nevertheless significant fof modern societies . 
P o p u l a r V i e w s o f Common Good. 
There are, at least， five widely held views of common 
good . The f i r s t and the most basic one takes that a 
common good is some thing desired by all of us. For 
instance , if both you and me want to have ice-cream, then 
having ice-cream is regarded as our common good. If a l l 
members of a family prefer Japanese food to Chinese food, 
then having Japanese food is regarded as their common 
good. If all citizens of Hong Kong demand democracy, then 
democracy is regarded as our common good. This view, 
however, is too simple that we may interpret i t in two 
completely different ways . On the one hand, i t seems 
d i f f i cu l t for all members of a society to desire the same 
thing since different persons desire different things . 
Some desire a glamorous l i fe while others want a simple 
way of l i v i ng； some b e l i e v e in C h r i s t i a n i t y wh i l e o t h e r s 
hold Islam； some think counting grass is a good form of 
l i f e while others think practising philosophy is more 
meaningful . On the other hand, i t is perfectly possible 
that a l l members of a society desire similar things . And 
2
 This distinction is made by Taylor (1989a, 167-70). 
g' 
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in fact we do similarly des.ir e something, such as money, 
shelter , food and fame . According to this view, all these 
things are common goods of the society. But i t is 
nonsense to take this interpretation because i t would 
include al l those t r iv ia l matters (say, sleeping and 
eating) as common goods. Hence, this basic view of common 
good must be modified so that i t s meaning may become 
clearer.3 The next three views of common good are 
modified vers ions of this basic one . And the second and 
third views may be seen in the light of Rawls ' dist inction 
between the concept and the conception of the good. This 
dist inct ion must be explained before we come to these 
views of common good. 
Rawls goes along with the u t i l i t a r i ans to think that 
the concept of the good is defined as "the sat isfact ion of 
rational desires" ( 1971 , 93) .
4
 One thing is good if i t is 
acquired by someone in satisfying his desire, either for 
i t s own sake or for the sake of some other desires . But 
Rawl s departs from the u t i l i t a r i ans because he thinks they 
fa i l to take seriously the distinctness of different 
persons' conceptions of the good ( 19 7 1 , 2 5-7 ) . According 
to Rawls, a c o n c e p t i o n of the good of a person consists of 
two parts , namely, a system of desires and a plan of l i f e . 
3
 This vague view of common good may also include the concepts of 
common project and of common goal (or common aim). As long as the 
good is defined as what we desire, a project or a goal is something 
desired by some people if it is valued as their good by themselves. 
I shall discuss these concepts later. 
*•
 4
 The meaning of "rational" is a big issue. I am not going to 
deal with it here. For Rawls' own usage, see 1971, 411-7. • 
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A system.of desires is a hierarchy or a preferential order 
of his desires whereas the plan of l i f e is indeed a matrix 
of sub-plans to pursue these desires . As our circum-
stances and natural talents d i f fe r , our preferential 
orders of desires are different although most, perhaps 
a l l , of us desire similar things . Consequently, for 
similar reason, our plans (or sub-plans) for the 
sat isfact ion of desires are different from each other, and 
thus are ranked different ly according to each one's own 
preferential order of desires . Based upon this 
dis t inct ion, I am going to distinguish the second and 
third views of common good. 
The second view sees common good as our common 
ultimate desire . By this I mean the thing which is 
desired for i t s own sake and is ranked as the highest , by 
al l of us, in our conception of the good . However, if we 
really take thi s view, i t means that we are crossing out 
the very possibi l i ty of the existence of any common good. 
Since everyone has his own conception of good l i fe and 
ranks things dif ferent ly , i t follows that different 
persons may prefer different desires as their ultimate 
desires. Suppose that al l of us desire a car . But we may 
rank i t different ly in our conceptions of the good and 
only a few may see i t as their ultimate desire . It means, 
therefore, that i t is extremely d i f f i cu l t for us to have 
a
 common ultimate desire, or that the probability of there 
being one is defini tely low. 
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The third view defines common good as our common 
conception of good l i f e . That is , a l l of us have the same 
conception of good l i f e . I think the probability for us 
to have a common conception of good l i fe in a society is 
lower than to have a common 'ultimate desire . Even if two 
men prefer the same form of l i f e , the l i f e of being a 
priest , for instance, their preferential orders may s t i l l 
d i f fer in great many aspects . With regard to the modern 
social conditions, especially the number of people and the 
diversity of cultures, i t seems to have no hope to bring 
• - . 一. • 
individual conceptions of good l i f e to a convergency. It 
is , of course, logically possible to have common goods in 
the second and third senses, but i t is practically 
unreal is t ic to expect their existence . I think 
communitarians do not mean these e i t he r / 
There is a fourth view of common good. As we have 
already seen from the f i r s t view, we do in fact commonly 
desire quite many things, such as money, shel ter , fame and 
food. Of course, these things are not our ultimate 
desires . They are neither desired f o r their own sake nor 
ranked as the highest in our conceptions of the good. 
A l t hough some of them a r e even t r i v i a l matters , some of 
them are not and we rather need them utmos t ly . For 
example, a i r , e lec t r ic i ty and water supplies, the police 
and urban hygiene services , the government, and the social 
conditions in which we can pursue our desires . All these 
things or services are desired by or desirable for us. 
Th t s e a r e what t he e conom i s t s c a l l t h e p u b l i c g o o d s . 
«E« 
26 
A1though our ultimate desires vary, we need these public 
goods for the pursuit of our ultimate desires and our 
conceptions of the good. However, one may argue that not 
al l of us need these goods . For instance, the green 
ac t iv is t s may not desire e lec t r ic i ty supplies； the 
anarchists may not want police and government . In view of 
this objection, we have to modify this view of common good 
by supplying a l i s t of goods which are more basic and more 
generally needed . Rawls ' l i s t of primary goods sa t i s f ies 
this modification very well. These primary goods are 
r ights , l ibert ies , opportunities , powers , income, wealth 
and self-respect . They are primary because they are a l l -
purpose and necessary for everyone‘s pursuit of his 
conception of the good, no matter what conception of the 
good one has . Perhaps for some people, these primary 
goods may f i t the communitarian account of common good. 
I shall examine this la ter . 
The f i f th view of common good is usually raised in 
the following circumstances . When a government decided to 
build a new airport or highway, the government o f f ic ia l s 
or other people supporting the project would persuade the 
public in this way： building the new airport would raise 
both the employment rate and the gross national income , so 
that i t would benefit a l l citizens . They thought i t would 
even benefit those people objecting the project (perhaps 
those who live nearby the site of the new airport) . They 
tend to see the airport or some other similar pub l ie 
Pt.ojects or their resulting circumstances as common goods. 
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This view differs from the f i r s t four views in an 
important respect . For the above views, a common good 
must be desired by al l of us . For this view, a common 
good need not be desired by al l of us . Rather, whether 
one thing is a common good is determined by whether i t 
benefits al l of us. 
It is unclear that which of these views is held by 
l iberals . For example, Rawls, who follows Mill, 
characterizes common good as " [the conditions and 
objectives] that are similarly to everyone ' s advantage" 
(1971, 233) . For Kymli cka, common good is defined as "the 
interests of the members of the community" (1989a, 7 6). 
Both characterizations are too vague . At f i r s t sight, 
they seems to f i t into the last view, that is , a common 
good is determined by whether i t benefits all of us . 
However, since both Rawls and Kymlicka are right-based 
l ibera ls , they would not deprive the final say of any 
individual in deciding his own good. In short , they would 
not uphold the last view. Thus , I think, l iberals would 
either accept the second or third view in concluding that 
there is in fact no common good at a l l , or they would take 
the fourth view, that is , common goods as primary goods . 
However, in my opinion, communitarians would 
subscribe to none of the five views. It is because these 
views f a l l short of the communitarians ' specific sense in 
using the term "common good" . This specific sense depends 
on the meanings of words "common
M
 and "good" which will be 
c lar i f ied in the following sections . 
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Two S e n s e s o f " C o m m o n ” 
1 . The popular views of common good share two 
characteristics . First , they rely on a meta-ethical 
theory of the good that what is desired is good. But for 
communitarians , the good is hot necessarily related to our 
desires. Secondly, what these views mean by "common" is 
in a sense of convergency. By "convergency" I mean that 
different persons accidentally do the same thing or have 
the same desire . For communitarians , however, this is 
only the weak sense of "common" . I am going to take up 
the issue of "common" in the following paragraphs and 
shall come to that of "good" in the next section. 
In "Cross-Purposes： The Communitarian-Liberal Debate" 
(Taylor 1989a), Taylor tr ies to recover an older, and 
somehow lost , but stronger notion of "common" than that 
al l owed by l iberals and most of us . This stronger notion 
rel ies on the distinction between "for-you-for-me" and 
"for-us" . It is usually thought that "for us" is 
equivalent to "for you and for me". But in some cases, as 
pointed out by Taylor, "for us" cannot be reduced to the 
aggregation of "for you" and "for me". He i l lus t ra tes 
this with an example of enjoying the fine weather with 
one's neighbour ( 19 8 9a, 167-8) . Enjoying the fine weather 
myself is different from enjoying i t with you . If I enjoy 
the fine weather myself , I may say it is something 
(whether good or not) for me. If I enjoy i t with you, I 
may say i t is something (whether good or not) for us . But 
to what extent am I enjoying the fine weather wi th you? 
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Or, to what extent are we enjoying i t together? Two cases 
can be distinguished ： (1) I am enjoying i t by your side 
without talking to you； and (2) we are enjoying it side by 
side while we are talking to each other . Only the second 
case can be described as "I am enjoying i t wi th you" or 
"we are enjoying it together” in the s t r i c t sense. The 
f i r s t case cannot be said so. (Whether we are happier in 
the second case than in the f i r s t is another question 
which, I think, is irrelevant here .) And i t is only in 
the second case that our enjoying the fine weather 
together can be correctly described as some thing for us. 
By contrast, our enjoying the fine weather "together" in 
the f i r s t case can only be described as the mere 
aggregation of my enjoying it and your enjoying i t . The 
second case cannot be reduced to the f i r s t . 
The enjoying-together cannot be reduced to the 
aggregate of enjoying-alone because they are two kinds of 
act iv i t ies carried out in different spaces , namely, the 
common space and private spaces. When we are enjoying the 
fine weather together, we converse . This activity is 
carried out in a space common (or public) to us. This 
common space is created by our dialogue (or 
communication). "Dialogue" (or "communication") here 
means i t s broad sense . It may be in form of spoken or 
written words； or i t may be s imply composed of a greeting 
"Hi’’ and an interjection of accord "Unhunh" (Taylor 1989a, 
167); or, s t i l l , i t may be conducted through bodily 
movements or gestures . It is our dialogue that creates 
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the common space . And only in the common space our common 
ac t iv i t i es , that is , ac t iv i t ies for us , are possible. In 
the example, our s i t t ing side by side enjoying the weather 
without talking is not anything for us . It can only be 
described as two strangers s i t t ing side by side, doing the 
same thing (say, enjoying the fine whether) accidentally 
within two separate private (in the sense of non-common) 
spaces . In their own private spaces , there is no place 
for the other . Their accidentally doing the same thing is 
only a convergency of individual actions . In this case, 
what is lacking is the common space created by dialogue . 
It is this common space makes for-us irreducible to for-
you-for-me. In ordinary speech, however, both for-us and 
for-you-for-me are often understood as "common". But for 
communitarians, only the for-us is understood as "common". 
I shall call for-us the strong sense or dialogical sense 
of "common" and for-you-for-me the weak sense or aggregate 
sense of "common". For the sake of c la r i ty , I shall 
r e s t r i c t myself to employ the word "common" in the case of 
for-us and "aggregate" or "convergent “ in the case of for-
you-f or-me . 
2. Two corollaries stem from this dist inction . The 
f i r s t is about the common space . We have already seen 
that the for-us belongs to a common space created by our 
communication or dialogue . Only the ac t iv i t i e s carried 
out in the common space can be called common actions or 
common act iv i t ies (in the strong sense of "common"). For 
• f 
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•example, without communication, a gathering of people is 
not a common act ivi ty at al l but can only be described as 
a mere aggregation of people . Conversely, with 
communication, a mere aggregation of people gets across 
the border between for-you-for~me and for~us, and thus 
become a community.^ Let us think about a fes t ival . A 
fes t ival is impossible if there was no communication among 
i t s participants . If i t s participants did not communicate 
or had no intent ion to communicate with one another , a 
"fest ival" would not be a real , happy fest ival but a 
r i tua l . 
The second corollary is about the relation between 
the common space and the good we value . As I have 
indicated above, a common act ivi ty is carried out in a 
common space. I f , according to Aris tot le 's def ini t ion, 
every action aims at some goods (1985, 1), then a common 
good must be aimed a t by such a common act ivi ty. That i s , 
something can be good commonly, or can belong to the for~ 
us , only if i t is or will be brought about by our common, 
dialogical actions . It must be noted that some common 
actions are always accompanied with some individual 
actions, like the enjoying the fine weather together. Or, 
i t seems more correct to say that the enjoying-together is 
originated from the separate individual ac t iv i t ies , that 
5
 The distinction between a community and a society made in 
Taylor's "Atomism" (1985b, 187-210) should be read in light of the 
distinction between for-you-for-me and for-us. "Society" is usually 
taken to mean the atomist vision of human society held by the 
liberals. In light of the latter distinction, it is monological or 
aggregative while "community" is dialogical. 
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is , my enjoying alone and your enjoying i t alone . When we 
s tar t our conversation, our separate ac t iv i t ies in the 
private spaces are transformed by our dialogue into a 
common act ivi ty . Therefore, what is valued a s good is the 
aim of this common activi ty rather than the aims of the 
original separate ac t iv i t ies . And what we are enjoying is 
the good of this common activity instead of the goods of 
the separate ones. In short , for communitarians, a common 
good is and must be good for us rather than the mere 
aggregation of the good for you and the good for me. 
Based on the strong sense of "common", we can then 
. c lar i fy both the meanings of and the relations among some 
terms which are usually connected with "common good". 
They are "common action", "common identity", "common 
end/goal" and "common project/enterprise" . This 
c la r i f ica t ion will lead us to the above mentioned 
dist inct ion between "mediately common good" and 
"immediately common good" (Taylor 198 9a, 168-9) . And I 
shall argue that i t is the la t ter kind of common good that 
communitarians should advocate . However, I must: defer 
this task for a while until the issue of "good" has been 
cleared up. 
D i v e r s i t y o f G o o d s 
1. As mentioned before, the five popular views of common 
good rely on the meta-ethical theory of the good that what 
• 
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is desired is good. ^  This theory seems to be a common 
sense now (the word "common" here need not be understood 
in the dialogi cal , strong sense) . Rawls, on the other 
hand, inheri ts the meta-ethical view about the good from 
his u t i l i t a r i a n predecessors: the good is the sa t i s fac t ion 
of rational desires . One thing or ac t iv i ty is good if the 
acquisit ion or the doing of i t s a t i s f i e s one's desire for 
i t s e l f or for other desires . However, Sande1 cal ls th i s 
view the "impoverished theory of the good" ( 1982, 16 5-8 ). 
It is impoverished because, f i r s t , i t conflates d i f fe ren t 
kinds of goods . For communitarians, such as Taylor 
( 1985b，230-47) and Walzer ( 1983) , there is a d ivers i ty of 
goods . Secondly, to define a l l goods only as the objects 
of our desires or as the sa t i s fac t ion of desires would 
confuse the dis t inct ion between "s Landard of assessment" 
and "the things being assessed" (Sandel 1982 , 167) . As a 
r e su l t , like his u t i l i t a r i a n predecessors, Rawls f a i l s to 
provide us with any standard of ranking our desires . And 
thus leads us to some kind of relat ivism the relat ivism 
of the good . 
‘This meta-ethical theory may be traced back to Aristotle. He 
wrote at the very beginning of his Nicomachean Ethics that "Every 
craft and every investigation, and likewise every action and decision, 
seems to aim at some good； hence the good has been well described as 
that at which everything aims" (1985, 1). It is also found in Hobbes . 
He said, "Whatsoever is the object of any man's desire ••• that is it 
which he for his part calleth good" (Quoted in Taylor 1985b, 201). 
Both Rawls and communitarians appeal to Aristotle in defining the 
good. To what extent are their theories of the good Aristotelian? 
This is another big question which I cannot deal with here. However, 
as Rawls says, although he incorporates in his theory of the good a 
principle of motivation which he calls "Aristotelian Principle", this 
principle is not explicitly stated by Aristotle himself but one which 
would be accepted by Aristotle (1971, 426n20). 
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Let us see how the communitarian argument goes. To 
begin with, there are different kinds of goods . To define 
the good in terms of the objects of our desires or the 
sat isfact ion of which is too narrow. 11 t reats different 
kinds of goods as if they are of the same kind. I do not 
mean by this that goods cannot be defined in this way. I 
think this claim is perhaps too strong. Rather, my claim 
is only that goods may be defined in some other ways 
besides relating them to desires . 
For communitarians , the word "good’’ is used in many 
—"•-- —— 
different ways . To connect i t with desires is just one 
among them. So, describing one thing as good does not 
necessarily imply desiring i t . My saying "a good boy" 
with my eyes staring at the kid living next door does not 
mean that I desire that kid or I desire to have my own . 
The good may be a function-related concept. By this I 
mean the usage of the word "good" is related to the 
function of the object i t describes . For MacIntyre ( 1984 , 
58), "watch" and "farmer" are functional concepts that 
they are defined in terms of the functions of a watch and 
of a farmer respectively, such as keeping time and 
farming. Whether a particular watch or a particular 
farmer is good depends on whether the watch or the farmer 
f u l f i l i t s or his functions . We say a watch is good 
because i t f u l f i l s the functions of a watch. In ordinary 
conversations, however, most of us seldom say a watch is 
good though it t e l l s time accurately. Perhaps we say so 
only when those watches are made of precious metal or 
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jewellery and tel l time accurately. Obviously, our usage 
of the term "good" involves something more than a 
function. This "something" is what Maclntyre calls the 
"standard of excellence" (1984) or what Taylor calls the 
"constitutive distinction" '(1985b, 32-7) or "qualitative 
distinction" ( 198 5b, 234-44； 1989b, 19-24) . (I shall use 
these terms interchangeably. ) To explicate this idea, let 
us see how the good is understood a s a practice-related 
concept . 
A practice may be defined in stages . A practice is 
basically defined as the human activity which is 
constituted or made possible by a set of rules . Chess, 
school , voting, football and a number of social 
inst i tut ions and games are paradigm examples of this basic 
definition of practice . In these examples , the rules of 
the games or institutions are constitutive in the sense 
that wi thout the rules , some kinds of human act ivi t ies 
such as playing chess, schooling, voting or playing 
football are impossible . This concept of practice, as 
argued by Taylor, may be extended to human act iv i t ies that 
are not constituted by explicit rules . He writes ： 
Even in an area where there are no clearly defined 
rules, there are distinctions between different sorts 
of behaviours such that one sort is considered the 
a p p r o p r i a t e form f o r one a c t i o n or c o n t e x t , the o t h e r 
for another action or context； for example doing or 
saying certain things amounts to breaking off 
negotiations, doing or saying other things amounts to 
making a new offer (1985b， 34). 
The dist inct ions with which we evaluate whether certain 
behaviours are appropriate are similar to the explicit 
rules constitutive of the practice of chess . Taylor, calls 
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them "constitutive distinctions". Without these 
constitutive dist inctions , some behaviours, such as 
breaking a negotiation or making an offer , are impossible. 
These constitutive distinctions hence may be regarded as 
"implicit norms“ of the practice (1985b, 3 5). Thus, 
Taylor defines practices or inst i tut ions as the human 
ac t iv i t i e s "constituted by certain dist inctions and hence 
a certain language which is thus essential to them" 
(1985b, 3 5). And according to Maclntyre, a practice is 
any coherent and complex form of socially established 
cooperative human activity through w h i c h goods. . - -
internal to that form of activity are realized in the 
course of trying to achieve those standards of 
excellence which are appropriate to, and par t ia l ly 
definit ive of, that form of act ivi ty, with the result 
that human powers to achieve excellence , and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended (19 8.4, 18 7). 
Back to the case of a watch. When we describe a watch 
made of gold as a good watch, this may involve a kind of 
aesthetic practice or one of the pecuniary values . 
However, constitutive distinctions exist not only in 
practices without explici t rule but also in practices 
constituted by explici t rules . In case of playing chess, 
every move must be made in accordance with the rules and 
may be evaluated as good or bad. Similarly, to be a good 
s t r iker in a soccer team is more than f u l f i l l i ng the 
function of a s t r iker and complying with the rules of the 
game . That is to say, to evaluate whether a move in a 
chess game or a s t r iker in a game of soccer is good 
involves the constitutive distinctions or standards of 
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excellence. By contrast, the explicit rules are invoked 
for determining the legitimacy of a move or an action. 
The standards of excellence evolve through matches of 
soccer and games of chess . As Maclntyre states： every 
p r a c t i c e has i t s h i s t o r y and " e x c e l l e n c e " must be 
understood his tor ical ly ( 1984 , 189-90) . Standards of 
excellence are sometimes hardly articulated but are shared 
by people practising the game . A person who has practised 
a game for a longer time is usually in a better position 
to judge whether one plays i t good or bad. For example, 
a person who has practised soccer for twenty years is in 
principle more authoritative than me, who has been 
practising i t for, say, two years , when saying that the 
Brazil team has not played well in the 19 94 World Cup 
Final.7 And I must, recognize his authority in evaluation 
of playing soccer. Thus puts Maclntyre, "To enter into a 
practice is to accept the authori ty of those standards and 
the inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them" 
(1984, 190). 
What is the relation between a practice and the good 
then? The answer is that a practice constitutes not only 
some kinds of ac t iv i t ies but also certain goods . A 
practice may be related to three kinds of goods, namely, 
the external good, the internal good and the good of 
performance. Only the la t te r two are constituted by a 
practice . Let us take the example of playing chess again 
'This example is based on and is a modification of the one 
suggested by W. L. Yik in a discussion in the fall of 1993, CUHK. 
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for i l lus t ra t ion (Maclntyre 1984, 188). I pay 50 cents to 
a child, who is not interested in playing chess, if he 
plays chess with me . He is not aiming at the pleasure of 
playing the game or the goal of winning the game . Rather, 
he is aiming at the reward of 50 cents which fac i l i t a t e s 
his other purposes . The reward is a good external to the 
game and is called "external good" . It can be achieved 
via means other than playing the game . The goals such as 
the pleasure of playing the game or the winning of the 
game are goods internal to the game . They are called 
"internal goods
M
. These internal goods can be achieved 
only when one is practising the game . In other words , the 
game as a practice constitutes or makes possible the 
internal goods of the game. A practice also constitutes 
another kind of good the goods of performance . This 
kind of good concerns whether an action performed in a 
practice is appropriate or is good. For example, whether 
a move in a game of chess is good, and whether an offer in 
a negotiation is appropriate . The goodness or 
appropriateness of an action is evaluated in accordance 
with the qualitative dist inctions or implicit norms of a 
practice . This kind of good of course fa l l s in the 
category of internal good because i t can only be achieved 
through some practices . But i t d i f fe rs a l i t t l e from the 
internal goals of a practice . I call the la t t e r "internal 
goods" while the former "goods of performance" in order to 
distinguish them. For example, the pleasure of playing 
chess or the winning of a game is different from the good 
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of making e xce11ent move. It is possible that someone can 
make legitimate moves but can hardly perform any excellent 
move. Yet, he may nonetheless enjoy playing chess 
(supposing that he is not playing for any external good). 
In this case, he is aiming at the internal goods of 
playing chess instead of the goods of performance. It 
proves that internal goods and goods of performance are 
not necessarily connected . 
Different practices have different constitutive 
dist inctions or standards of excellence which constitute 
the internal goods of the practices.. Also, in e very-
practice , t h e r e is also a diversity of internal goods and 
goods of performance . Pursuing the goal of a practice is 
an internal good. Fulf i l l ing certain standards of 
excellence of a practice is achieving the goods of 
performance of that practice . 
To sum up what I have explored so far . Besides being 
understood as desire-related concept , for communitarians, 
the good may be understood as function-related concept and 
practice-related concept . Indeed, i t is not only a 
diversi ty of understandings (or definit ions) of the good. 
It is also a diversity of goods . The poss ib i l i t i es of 
these goods are re-opened when we accept the function- and 
practice-related concepts of the good. 
Return to our moral (or pol i t ica l ) l i f e . Moral goods 
should be understood as practice-related concept rather 
than function-related concept . For example, a fireman is 
a 'good firemen if he saves lives during performing duties . 
r* 
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It is because he f u l f i l s the functions defining his role 
of a fireman. But he would not be a morally good man if 
he would not save l i f e off duty. The standards of moral 
evaluation of man must involve more than the functions or 
definitions of roles . Also, to judge whether a man is 
good should not only focus on his way of l i fe or 
conception of good life； nor should we only concentrate in 
seeing whether he f u l f i l s his quest (that i s , his l i f e -
long goal) or not . Rather, we should also judge him in 
terms of the standards of human excellence which are 
evolved through human history. Here I see a human l i f e , 
the l i f e of a social being instead of a physical or 
biological being, as a practice which is constituted by 
some standards of excellence . For instance, we should 
judge whether he is sincere, whether he cares others, or 
whether he is honourable . These standards are implicit 
rather than explicit and well-defined rules . They are 
constitutive in the sense that without them we cannot 
understand what a sincere or honourable behaviour i s . 
Right and justice are constitutive dist inctions of this 
kind and are pract ice-related. In other words , they may 
not be universally applicable to al l kinds of human 
ac t iv i t i es • 
2. One may argue that this account of the diversity of 
understandings of the good does not change the terrain so 
much. The function-related concept and the practice-
r&lated concept of the good may be reduced to the desired-
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related concept. For example, the function of keeping 
t ime of a wa tch , t h e i n t e r n a l goods of p l a y i n g ches s ( t h a t 
i s , the pleasure of playing chess or the winning of a 
game) and the internal good of negotiation (that is , to 
reach an agreement) . All of these things are the desired 
properties in the ac t iv i t ies in question. In fact , the 
function-related concept and the practice-related concept 
of the good are nothing new to l iberals . Rawls 
i l l u s t r a t e s his definit ion of the good in these ways too . 
He defines the good of a watch as "the features which i t 
is rational to want in a watch" such as the "keeping 
accurate time" and "not be excessively heavy" (1971, 401). 
To him, the phrase "a good cadaver" conveys more sense 
than " a good corpse" in the practice of anatomy (19 71, 
々02). And he defines the notion of a good person as the 
possession of some properties which are required by the 
roles he assumes, such as the role of a cit izen, a doctor -
or a farmer (1971, 435). 
I admit that the functions of something and the 
internal goods and goods of performance of a practice can 
be the objects of our desires . But i t does not follow 
that the function-related concept and the practice-related 
concept can be reduced to the des ire-related concept . It 
• is because what matters to the former two concepts is not 
whether some goods are objects of our desires . Rather, 
what matters i s whe t he r some goods are made good by our 
desires or not . What the function- and practice-related 
concepts indicate is therefore the notion that some goods 
d" 
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are independent of our desires . Let us take an example to 
i l l u s t r a t e this point . I may not desire playing chess， 
but my not desiring this practice does not therefore make 
i t s internal goods and goods of performances no good any 
more. On the contrary, a good move in a chess game or a 
good strike in a soccer game is not made good by my 
desiring i t . It is good in terms of the practice in 
question and the standards of excellence of the practice 
(Taylor 1985b, 242-3) . Rawls' definition of the good, at 
f i r s t glance , looks like the communitarian ones. But in 
fact Rawls explicit ly discards the evaluative or 
prescriptive dimension of the good, which is the central 
element of communi Larian definit ion, and maintains only 
the descriptive meaning of "good" (Rawls 1971, 403, 404-
7) . As a result: , the good is defined as the properties in 
some thing or in some ac t iv i t ies , and is compared in terms 
of quantity of the properties in the things or ac t iv i t i es 
desired (1971, 399, 424-33, 435). And i t is this over-
emphasized quantitative dimension of Rawls' theory of the 
good that communitarians argue against . For 
communi tariang , to define the good in terms of desire 
misses the very point that some goods are the standards of 
evaluation of other goods . This is the second stage of 
the communitarian argument that Rawls ' theory of the good 
conflates the standards of assessment and the things being 
assessed. Let me turn back to i t now. 
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* E v a l u a t i o n o f G o o d s 
1. Rawls disagrees with util i tarianism for i t conflates 
the "diverse systems of desires" of different persons , 
seeing which as if they are identical to an unique system 
of desires of one person (1971, 22-30) . He argues that 
different persons have different conceptions of the good 
and that within each conception of the good， every person 
ranks his desires differently in accordance with his own 
preference . However, this characterization of the 
conception of the good aims to see all goods as objects of 
our desires . According to the analysis in last section, 
however, some goods may not be determined by our desires 
although they may be desired . To see all goods as objects 
of our desires has two consequences . First , i t pushes 
Rawls towards some kinds of subjectivism. Since desires 
are personal or subjective, all goods would be understood 
as personal or subjective . And as a conception of the 
good consists of a system of desires, it would then be 
personal or subjective too. However , as Sandel ar gue.s , if 
Rawls tr ies to argue against u t i l i t a r ians that every 
system of desires is moral ly different , he must te l l us 
how the desires within a system be ordered (Sandel 1982, 
165-8) . But Rawls fa i l s to do so . For Sandel , there are 
two senses of ordering of desires： 
Is a
 1
 system of desire
 1
 a set of desires ordered in 
a certain way, arranged in a hierarchy of relative 
worth or essential connection with the identity of 
the agent , or is i t s imply a concatenation of desires 
arbi t rar i ly arranged, distinguishable only by their 
, relative intensity and accidental location ( 1982 , 
167)? 
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If Rawls takes the f i r s t sense of ordering, that is , to 
distinguish the desires within a system or a person in 
terms of their qualitative differences, he would have to 
provide an adequate "standard of assessment" or "standard 
of appraisal" for the ranking of desires . But, for 
Sandel, Rawls provides us with no adequate standard of 
ranking desires either within one system of desires (that 
is , within one person) or among systems (that is , among 
persons ). 
If Rawls means the second sense of ordering, then our 
systems of desire are merely arbitrary collections of 
accidentally arising desires . Such kind of system, if i t 
could be called a system at a l l , is at best an ordering by 
personal preference . It: sees desires as having no 
quali tat ive difference . Remember that , as I have already 
shown, the objects of our desires may be different kinds 
of goods which are determined not by our desires but by 
certain qualitative dist inctions . And because of th i s , 
desires are different in quality and in kind . Sandel 
hence argues that to order desires in this way is to 
conflate al l the desires within a system or a person. If 
so, i t seems no reason "why the integrity of such a 
'system' should be taken so mora 1ly and metaphysically 
seriously" ( 1982 , 16 7 ； emphasis added) . Why do not we 
take the who 1e community as an unique system of desire? 
If a person's choice of his end depends on nothing but his 
mere preference, mere subjective feeling, then how can we 
jus t i fy that his system of desire is qual i ta t ively 
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different from other systems ？ If Rawls cannot just ify so, 
why should we give up utilitarianism? For Sande 1, the 
only reason lef t for Rawl s seems to be some kinds of 
subjectivism. He argues that Rawls must allow a person to 
rank his desires differently from other persons because 
"[o]nly the person himself can
 1
 know' what he really wants 
or 'decide ' what he most prefers" ( 1982 , 171) . Let me 
call i t "extreme subjectivism". It is in fact a 
solipsism. But I do not quite agree with Sandel at this 
point. Rawls himself would not subscribe to such an 
extreme kind of subjectivism. 
When Rawls comments on the arguments against 
ut i l i tar ianism, he says that 
skepticism about interpersonal comparisons is often 
based on questionable views: for example, that the 
intensity of pleasure or of the enjoyment which 
indicates well-being is the intensity of pure 
sensation； and that while the intensity of such 
sensations can be experienced and known by the 
subject, i t is impossible for others to know it or to -
infer i t with reasonable certainty. Both these 
contentions seem wrong (1971, 91; my emphasis). 
Rawls would regard our feelings or sensations as public 
knowledge . I mean by this that a particular person's 
feelings or sensations are possible to be known or 
inferred by others , either by communication between them 
or by observing the person's overt conducts . Since the 
feelings or sensations of goods may be known publicly, one 
can advise on what is good for another. A climber, for 
instance, may advise his partner about the use of 
equipment and route on a d i f f i cu l t pitch. He takes up his 
partner 's standpoint and consider what is good for his 
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partner and "recommends what he thinks is a sensible plan 
of attack" (Rawls 1971 , 406). However, Rawls' position on 
this matter is not clear enough because he thinks, in this 
example , the climber ' s recommendation is only advisory. 
When his advice is in conflict with his partner 's own 
opinion, his partner has the exclusive right to decide on 
the matter. That i s , every person remains the f inal 
authority on the question what is good for himself. 
However, for c ommun i t a r i an s , the climber's recommendation 
is more than an advice. When he makes the recommendation, 
he is invoking a standard of excellence which is internal 
to the practice of mountaineering and constitutes a good 
of performance the "good attack". That means, he is 
picking out a cri terion of what amounts to a "good 
attack" . It renders that the individual may not be the 
f inal authority of knowing his good . So c o n t r a s t e d , Rawls 
remains a subjectivist , though not a whole-hearted one, a 
moderate subject ivis t . 
One may defend Rawl s in this way. The question 
whether an action in mountaineering a "good attack" is of 
instrumental value . It may be judged objectively by 
whether i t is a rational or an effective means to achieve 
certain ends . I agree to this if a "good attack" is 
interpreted instrumentally. But if i t is interpreted as 
a good of performance or an internal good of the practice, 
i t is hardly possible to be judged in terms of 
effectiveness or other instrumental terms alone. For 
I** 
example, a climber may choose to climb up a dangerous 
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cl i f f for nothing but the climbing i t se l f . Obviously, he 
would not count this act ivi ty in terms of effectiveness 
alone； otherwise he should have chosen to take a 
helicopter . 
If Rawls fa i l s to provide a standard of assessing our 
desires, he could not distinguish the qualitative 
differences among desires . If so, how can he jus t i fy that 
my system of desire , which a rb i t ra r i ly ranks X over Y, is 
morally different from yours , which a rb i t r a r i ly ranks Y 
over X? Rawls would solve these questions by appealing to 
the Aristotelian Principle (1971, 424-33), a principle of 
motivation. It assumes that 
other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise 
of their realized capacities (their innate or trained 
ab i l i t i e s ) , and this enjoyment increases the more the 
capacity is realized, or the greater i t s complexity 
(1971 , 426). 
It implies: (1) that complicated ac t iv i t ies , which 
involves higher sk i l l s and ab i l i t i e s , would produce more 
fun ； and (2) that rational human beings would prefer 
complicated ac t iv i t ies to simple ones. For instance , we 
prefer playing chess to playing checkers , algebra to 
arithmetic (1971, 426). Thus, i t may explain how and why 
one ranks desires di f ferent ly in his conception of the 
good. It seems alright at f i r s t glance . On second 
thoughts , however, i t appears to be the contrary. Why do 
some people prefer cycling to driving? Or, why do some 
people prefer simpler style of living? For 
communitarians, cycling and simpler style of living are of 
different kinds of goods . They are not evaluated in 
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instrumental terms , such as effectiveness of achieving 
ends or complexity of sk i l l s or ab i l i t i es required. They 
are evaluated in terms of the practices in question and of 
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the standards of excellence of a good human l i f e . In 
short, the Aristotelian Principle is inadequate for 
ranking desires for different kinds of goods . 
One would argue that the above argument is partly 
correct only. It is right that Rawls fa i l s to provide an 
adequate standard of ranking and hence conflates the 
desires within a system (that is，a person) . But i t does • 
not follow that Rawls has no reason not to conflate 
different systems of desires . All Rawls needs to show is 
t h a t o n e ' s p r e f e r e n t i a l o r d e r of d e s i r e s i s different f rom 
others ' . For instance, although I cannot explain why I 
prefer X over Y and you cannot ei ther, you and I 
nevertheless have the right to rank them dif ferent ly . No 
matter how you and I rank X and Y, ray ranking is different 
from yours . That is enough. And you and I therefore have 
different conceptions of good l i f e . From l iberals ' point 
of view, there is no qualitative difference between 
conceptions of good l i f e . 
I think, however, even if Sandel is not completely 
r ight , l iberals are not ei ther. The answer to this 
counter-argument must be resorted to our moral experience . 
I must confess that , within a certain range, perhaps a 
great range, most of our conceptions of good l i f e are not 
s ignif icant ly different in qualitative terms. That means, 
1
 Cf. Taylor on "hypergoods" (1989b, 62-75). 
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i t is hard to say whether a conception of good l i f e is 
morally better or worse than the rest . But there are 
s t i l l a lot of conceptions of good l i fe fal l ing outside 
this range and are considered to be morally unworthy or 
bad, such as the l i fe as a drug - t raff icker , a drug-addict , 
a thief or a prosti tute . To say that these conceptions of 
good (?) l i f e are morally worthy or unworthy is more than 
to say that they are desired or not . Indeed, whether they 
are desired by someone is irrelevant to the determining of 
their goodness. When we evaluate them, we are invoking 
certain standards which are ignored in Rawls' impoverished 
theory of the good. This leads to the second consequence 
of seeing all goods as desires that Rawls has committed to 
relativism and fa i l s to distinguish the worth of different 
conceptions of good l i f e . 
2. To see all goods as objects of desires is to confuse 
the qualitative differences among various kinds of goods. 
It would result in seeing some goods, such as s inceri ty , 
honesty and benevolence , as secondary or supererogatory 
because they are not desired for myself but for others 
(Rawls 1971, 191-2, 438-9； Sandel 1982, 180-1). But for 
communitarians, these goods are constituted by some 
qualitative dist inctions or standards of human excellence . 
They are not supererogatory but superior than our desires 
and conceptions of the good l i f e . They are the standards 
of assessment with which we evaluate one's moral worth, 
desires and conceptions of good l i fe (Taylor 1989b, ,20). 
50 
If we recognize that there are different kinds of 
goods, namely , desire-re1ated goods, function-related 
goods and practice-related goods, the characterization of 
a conception of good l i fe may be different . It may-
consist of a hierarchy of desires and plans of pursuing 
them, and i t may be informed by an ultimate desire. But 
i t may also be informed by a number of practice-related 
goods, that is , those constituted by the standards of 
human excellence . As a consequence, even if a conception 
of good l i fe is basically desired-related, i t can by no 
'• - . . 
means escape from our qualitative evaluations . 
It is undeniable that we do have different l i f e plans 
and that we have the right to form our own conceptions of 
good l i f e . But i t does not mean that the formation of 
one's conception of good l i fe is to ta l ly a private and 
personal matter . That is , when I am constructing ray 
conception of good l i f e , ranking my desires and sketching 
my plans of pursuing these desires, I do not appeal only 
to my accidentally arising preferences . Rather, I am 
indeed invoking certain standards of evaluation. These 
standards are the standards of human excellence . They are 
commonly shared by others in the sense that my ranking X 
over Y and my taking plan A instead of B are based on 
certain reasons which are understandable and acceptable by-
others . To put in the Taylor ian terms, my choice must 
make certain sense to rayse1f and to others . By "making 
sense" Taylor does not mean that some behaviour must be 
"rational" in some way. Rather, even an " i r ra t ional" 
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behaviour may make sense if we are supplied with a 
background story or a narrative which makes the behaviour 
coherent with the l i fe history , of the person in question 
( 1985b, 24).
9
 For example , i t is totally fair for someone 
to lead a l ife that ranks counting blades of grass higher 
than writing philosophical papers . However, why is 
counting blades of grass good for that guy? I would not 
be convinced if he said that he s imply desires or prefers 
i t . If he really told me so, I would say that this was 
what Maclntyre calls "radical choice" ( 1984). For Taylor, 
he was simply unreflective, not even as a "simple weigher" 
(1985a, 16-23). It is because, to be a simple weigher, 
one must able to evaluate or calculate the outcomes of 
alternative courses of actions . To appeal to mere 
preference i s not calculating yet. Counting blades of 
grass must, at least , make sense to himself； otherwise i t 
makes no sense to us. One may conjecture： perhaps " [h ] e 
is otherwise intell igent and actually possesses unusual 
ski l l s , since he manage s to survive by solving d i f f icu l t 
mathematical problems for a fee" ； or he may be "peculiarly 
neurotic and in early l i fe acquired an avers ion to human 
fellowship, and so he counts blades of grass to avoid 
having to deal with other people" (Rawls 1971 , 432). 
Articulating these reasons or hypotheses by this guy or by-
others is to make sense his form of l i f e . Conversely, if 
that guy is counting grass in his garden day by day 
J
 "Rational" and "irrational" are no doubt problematic but I 
cannot deal with them here. I use them only in their loose, ordinary 
senses . 
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without tell ing his reason to his wife and sons , they 
would probably be confused by and worrying about him. ^  
Choosing one form of l i f e , doing one thing instead of 
others must make sense . Making sense is a process of 
reasoning which is in principle articulable but in most 
cases i t is hard to art iculate . Taylor calls this process 
of articulation, either to oneself or to others , "strong 
evaluation" if it involves the worth of the things or 
behaviours being evaluated (1985a, 15-21). And i t is 
through this process of strong evaluation, we may judge 
whether a plan of l i fe is good. Strong evaluation must 
involve some moral worth or goods which are constituted by 
the standards of human excellence. These standards are 
evolved through human history and are by no means private 
or personal matters. If we see all goods as desire-
relatcd, ignoring that some goods are the standards of 
assessment, we lose the basis of strong evaluation. Thus ,
 v 
we cannot judge some forms of l i fe or some desires as 
undesirable or morally base or unworthy or of bad taste . 
Once Rawls inherits the u t i l i t a r i an impoverished theory of 
10
 Taylor depicts the importance of making sense in a rather . 
analogical way in Sources of the Self. For him, something or 
activities make sense to one person only within certain frameworks (or 
horizons) which are constituted by the qualitative distinctions the 
person adheres to. One cannot do without frameworks. "But a person 
without a framework altogether would be outside our space of 
interlocution； he wouldn11 have a stand in the space where the rest of 
us are. We would see this as pathological" (1989b, 31). Thus, making 
sense is not only the activity of reason giving. Instead, it is an 
activity of giving reason within certain frameworks. In most of the 
time we need not articulate these frameworks . We simply take them for 
granted. But if confusions or conflicts arise, articulating the 
frameworks we adhere to becomes a necessary condition of searching for 
understanding. 
53 
the good, he fa i l s to perceive these standards and thus 
dooms to be a re la t iv i s t in issue of the good. 
Two K i o d . s o f Common G o o d s 
y 
1. In the previous sections , I have articulated the 
meanings of " common" and "good". It seems that I am now 
in a better position to answer the question: what is 
common good? (And what is not?) According to Taylor, we 
may distinguish two kinds of common goods, name 1y, 
"mediately" and "immediately" common goods . However, 
before introducing this dist inction, i t is necessary to 
c la r i fy the relations between the terms "common good", 
"common action", "common identity", "common end/goal" and 
"common project/enterprise" . In the meantime , I shall 
a l s o s c r u t i n i z e t h e f i v e p o p u l a r views of common good 
outlined in the f i r s t section of this chapter. (In order 
to avoid unnecessary ambiguity, I shall call these views 
"common desire", "common ultimate desire", "common 
conception of the good" , "primary good" and "public 
project" respectively whereas the communitarian view will 
be called "common good".) 
These terms are inter-connected as if they are 
forming a constellation. Common good is often thought to 
be equivalent to a common project (or common enterprise) 
which may be defined as a common pursuit (or quest) for a 
common goal (or end) (Shih 1993, 11-3) . The actions taken 
by the participants of a common project in pursuing the 
common goal are thus thought to be common actions . , And 
54 
the part icipants of such a common project are identifying 
themselves accordingly with the project . In other words , 
they are sharing a common ident i ty . 
I want to raise three points to qualify the 
association of these terms . These qual i f icat ions are 
about the "common action", "common project" and "common 
ident i ty" . In the rest of this section, I am going to 
take up the f i r s t two . As " common identity" is rather 
complicated and needs more space for discussion, i t will 
be dealt with in the next chapter . 
F i r s t , I understand the term "common action" in i t s 
strong sense . That i s , a common action is one which is 
performed by more than one person within a common (in the 
sense of for-us) space created by their dialogue . In 
other words , common actions presuppose the dialogue or 
communication among the part ic ipants . Bear in mind that 
"dialogue” or "communi cation" is understood in i t s broad 
sense . And hence common actions must be some kinds of 
concerted (or coordinated) actions . For example, sawing 
a log together by two persons reci t ing a symphony by a 
orchestra (Shih 1993， 8) and building a godown by a group 
of carpenters are common actions . By contrast , two 
painters ' depicting the same lands cape on their own 
canvases (provided that they do not talk to each other) or 
two Zen masters' contemplating at the same time and place 
are by no means common actions . Besides being a concerted 
action, a common action must have a common purpose or goal 
»4' 
11
 I forget the source from which I borrow this example. 
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for the participants . The common goal of a common action 
may be explicit or implicit . For example, the purpose of 
sawing a log is explicit that the guys may want the timber 
for building a godown or just want to have fun. By 
contrast again, the painters labouring on their own 
canvases at the same si te may talk to each other . 
Although their conversation is a common action, i t may not 
have any explicit purpose, like seeking opportunity to run 
a join-exhibition or to join their pictures into one . 
However, their conversation does have an implicit 
purpose to open a common space . Common actions , which 
are carried out in a common space opened by conversation, 
in turn help to maintain the common space even if the 
conversation has stopped. 
This qualif ication helps us to distinguish common 
good from primary good (that is , the fourth popular view 
of common good) • Common goods must be constituted by-
common actions but primary goods (or public goods) are 
not . Taylor explicates this by an example ( 1989a, 169): 
people of Saint Jerome raise fund to bring the Montreal 
Symphony Orchestra to their town to perform a live 
concert. Since this is their f i r s t time to participate in 
a live concert, so to enjoy a live concert is their 
original purpose . But when the day comes, they discover 
f ina l ly that enjoying the live concert together is 
dif ferent from enjoying i t alone . This enjoying-together 
is resulted from the dialogue (in the broad sense) among 
the audience and the orchestra in the concert hal l . It is 
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in fact irreducible to the mere aggregation of the 
enjoyment of all the individual audience in the hal l . 
That i s , A and B and C's enjoying the concert together 
does not equal to A's enjoying i t alone plus B's enjoying 
i t alone plus C' s enjoying i t alone . The enjoying-
together is something new and was unexpected by the time 
they started the project . In other words , the en j oying-
together is not their original purpose . Their original 
purpose is rather the aggregate of enjoying-alone . Their 
new pu rpose i s c r e a t e d by t h e i r common a c t i o n s in t h e 
darkened hall . Their original project of bringing the 
Montreal Symphony Orchestra to Saint Jerome for the 
purpose of the aggregate of enjoying-alone is similar to 
the provision of police service and e lec t r ic i ty supply in 
the t own. Both are provided by collective effort of the 
town folk. On the contrary, the enjoying-together of the 
live concert is created by their common actions . I t 
belongs to the space of for-us, whereas the aggregate of 
enjoying-alone and the police service and e lec t r i c i ty 
supply belong to the space of for-you-for-me. So, in 
Taylor's term, police service and e lec t r ic i ty supply are 
"convergent goods" only. They are the objects of the 
convergent needs or desires of the town folk. This kind 
of convergency is a mere accident . Similarly, primary-
goods are convergent goods too . Like a i r , water and 
vitamins, primary goods are good for everybody and al l of 
us need them. You may even call them our "common desires" 
or "common interes ts" , but “common" here is only in i t s 
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weak sense (the non-dialogical, for-you~for-me sense). 
They'are good for you and good for me and so on, but they 
are by no means good for us commonly (in the strong 
sense). That means, they do not belong to the space of 
for-us . Since common goods must presuppose common 
actions , primary goods (or public goods) cannot be common 
goods in the specific sense . 
As to common desire, common ultimate desire and 
common conception of the good (the f i r s t , second and third 
popular views of common good), are they common goods in 
the specific sense? Of course, a common good may be 
desired by al l the persons committing to .it. But we must 
beware of two things . F i rs t , when we say one thing is our 
common good because i t is desired by al l of us, i t is 
actually a convergent good. It requires the convergency 
of our desires before i t can be called a common good. If 
common desire, common ultimate desire and common 
conception of the good fa l l in this case, then the 
adjective "common" is understood in i t s weak sense . But 
they would be rendered as unpractical because i t is 
implausible, if not impossible, for al l members of a 
society to have the same desire with same weight, or the 
same ultimate desire or the same conception of the good. 
The second thing is that a common good is constituted by 
our common action prior to our awareness of i t and our 
desiring i t . The common good in this case is in fact 
unrelated to desire at a l l . In short , what makes i t a 




so, then i t is inappropriate to describe common good as 
common desire or common ultimate desire or common 
conception of the good. 
- . 
2. As the f i r s t four popular views are rejected as 
common good in the specific sense, there remains the f i f t h 
view, namely, the public project that needs to be 
scrutinized. Since common good is often under stood as a 
common project, so the question whether public project 
means common project is of prior concern. This brings us 
to my second point qualifying common good ： what is a 
common project? 
A fest ival is a common project of a village or a 
t r ibe , and "one-country-two-system" may be another common 
project of people in Hong Kong. They are common goods , at 
least for those who participate in them. Building an 
airport and constructing a highway are sometimes seen as 
common projects of a society. They are regarded by some 
people as good for the whole society, and hence they are 
the common goods of al l members of the society though not 
a l l of them actual ly desire i t . On the other hand, 
friendship, a community and a republic are often called 
common projects too . Is there any difference among them? 
My answer is affirmative . 
In order to explicate the difference , I need f i r s t to 
introduce Taylor ' s distinction between "mediately" and 
"immediately" common goods (1989a, 168-9). Let me take 
the l i f e concert in Saint Jerome as example again. The 
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concert was originally a convergent good. It was 
designed, like the provision of police service, for the 
sake of fu l f i l l ing the desires of individuals engaged in 
the project. At the end, these people discovered that 
they had received more than they originally expected. 
They found that they were enjoying the live concert 
together which was irreducible to the aggregate of their 
enjoying it alone . The enjoying-together created by their 
common actions in the darkened hall was the newly created 
internal good of the project . This newly created good was 
a common good for both the orchestra and the audience 
because it was constituted by their common actions during 
the concert . The original project (that is , bringing the 
orchestra to Saint Jerome) was then transformed from a 
collective means (which serves individual needs and 
desires) to a common project with an internal good of i t s 
own, which was also the common good of all the 
participants of the concert. In other words , i t was 
mediated or transformed by their dialogue, their common 
actions in the darkened hall . The concert, which 
originally belongs to the space of the for—you — for—me , was 
turned into the space of the for-us through the common 
actions . The newly created common good the enjoying-
together is called "mediately common good". On the 
contrary, if the audience in the concert hall took no 
communication or common action, the enjoyment would not be 
different from their enjoying the concert through watching 
television in their own houses . Then, the w o u l d - b e -
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enjoying-together, which belongs to the space of for-us, 
would fa l l back into the space of for-you-for~me. 
Likewise, a fest ival without common action, if possible , 
would not be a real fest ival (which belongs to the for-us, 
a common space) but a ceremony (which belongs to the for-
you-for-me, an aggregate of private spaces) . Common 
projects are, in general, mediately common goods in the 
sense that they are mediated or trans formed by common 
actions from the for-you — for-me to the for-us . 
On the other hand, immediately common goods mean 
those goods which are already within the for-us or a 
common space at the outset . Friendship is a paradigm 
case. Friendship is impossible if we do not take action 
to make friends with others . The action of making friends 
must be dialogi cal rather than monologi. cal . Say, I could 
not be your friend if I were greeting your photographs in 
a secret room, or if you did not respond to my greeting or 
friendly smile in a face-to-face set t ing. And these 
common actions of us make our friendship ours, something 
for-us. Friendship is an immediately common good because 
i t is not trans formed or mediated from any original 
project which serves any purpose other than friendship . 
Friendship is i t se l f the original project and the 
"mediated" project at the same time. If friendship is not 
built upon our common actions , i t is impossible at a l l . 
We cannot even understand what friendship means at the 
very beginning. That means , without common action, 
friendship would not fa l l back f 
roni the f o r s to the for一 
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you-for-me but to nothing. Friendship as a common project 
should serve no purpose other than i t se l f . If I treat my 
friend as a means to some other ends , I am not treating my 
"friend" as a friend. I am indeed betraying the 
friendship between him and m'e . 
I propose to extend Taylor's dist inction between 
"mediately common good" and "immediately common good" in 
order to distinguish different kinds of common projects . 
I call the projects not mediated by common actions, like 
the original project of bringing the orchestra to Saint 
Jerome , "public projects". They serve the accidentally 
converged individual desires or needs only« Once they are 
mediated by the common actions of their participants and 
hence created the new common goods internal to them, they 
become "mediately common projects" . The newly created 
common goods may somehow be seen as the by-products of the 
original projects . As a corollary, a mediately common 
project always presupposes a public project with diverse 
individual goals . However , the projects , like friendship , 
are called "immediately common projects". They are not 
serving any individual desire. 
I think the projects like the building of an airport 
and a highway fa l l in the category of public project . But 
not every public project can be transformed into mediately 
common project . I t is doubtful whether the manual 
labours , the engineers and the top administrators of the 
new airport project of Hong Kong share any mediately 
common good. Do they carry out any common action? Do 
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they find themselves creating or having created any good 
internal to the project besides their individual goals? 
It is highly plausible that they do not . If so, we may 
reject the f i f t h popular view that public projects are 
common goods . 广 
The distinctions between mediately and immediately 
common goods and between public project, mediately and 
immediately common projects can help communitarians to 
reply a very strong challenge from liberals . For 
l iberals , 'if common good means mediately common project, 
then they would argue that either there i s in fact no 
common project or common goal in any society, even in a 
village or a family； or i t is arbitrary in determining 
when to interpret a public project as a common project. 
If someone insists that there is such a common good or 
common project to which individuals attach, then l iberals 
would argue that the common goal of the common project 
should have informed every individual 's conception of good 
l i f e . In fact , however, i t is implausible. In a modern 
society, taking Hong Kong as an example (or some other 
societies of similar scale, not to mention a nation or a 
country), citizens are not sharing a common project or 
goal . "One-country-two-system" is only a goal or a 
project for a particular sect of citizens of Hong Kong. 
Even for those who have accepted this goal , they -are in 
fact making use of i t for their own, implicit or expl ici t , 
purposes . It would not be a common project or common good 
in the s t r i c t sense required by communitarians . In case 
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of building an airport , l iberals would argue that i t is 
obviously not agreed to and desired by every citizen of 
Hong Kong. So, to interpret a public project which is not 
desired by al l as a common project would violate the 
principle of equal neutral concern and risk the well-being 
of the minority (Kyml i clca 19 8 9a, 7 6-7 ). 
I think l iberals are partly correct . Communitarians 
would agree that , under the modern social conditions, i t 
seems impossible for al l members of a society to desire a 
single public project . It is possible only in small 
groups of people, like a village or a club. So 
communi tarians should not advocate the mediately common 
goods which presuppose public projects . If communitarians 
real ly set themselves for such a task, they are not only 
too hard to succeed but also fal l prey to either nostalgia 
or parochialism. They would have pushed themselves either 
towards an ideal of some past societ ies , like those pre-
modern Christian European societ ies , or towards the 
localisation of small communities. This is only "an 
romanticized view of earl ier communities" (Kymli cka 1989a, 
8 5). However, I think the good of a mediately common 
project is not the right kind of common good that 
communitarians should advocate. I t is because mediately 
common project presuppose a public project which is 
desired by al l members of a society and is impossible in 
modern society. Therefore, I think communitarians should 
advocate the immediately common goods the goods 
constituted by immediately common projects . 
4 
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3. There may be another challenge from liberals . If 
communitarians advocate immediately common goods which is 
originated from immediately common projects , then is there 
any other immediately common good except that of 
friendship (granted that it is an immediately common 
project)? This challenge brings us to another major task 
of communitarians . That is , to interpret the state or the 
society a s a (mediately or immediately) common project 
which serves i ts internal good . This internal good is the 
immediately common good which bounds up the state or 
society. This task amounts to interpreting a state or a 
society as a community. I am not going to deal with this 
task here, but I want to point out that i t is a possible 
way out . In fact Taylor has attempted this task in his 
"Atomism" ( 1985b, 187-210) . Supposing a society can be 
interpreted as a communi ty (that is , a s a common project), 
i t may follow that there are many goods of pe r forma n c e 
which are constituted by the qualitative distinctions of 
the project (which can be seen as a practice) . For 
example, • protecting one's country and some other 
courageous actions (the goods of performance) are 
constituted by patriotism and courage (the qualitative 
distinctions) . These goods are constituted by the 
qualitative distinctions which are in turn constituted by 
the common actions of the members of the society. They 
s e r v e no o t h e r p u r p o s e bu t t h e e v a l u a t i o n of good 
p e r f o r m a n c e . T h u s , i f we a c c e p t t h a t a s o c i e t y i s a 
community an ；immediately common project of all i t s 
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members, and since every project has a diversity of 
internal goods and goods of performance, then i t is 
possible that there are other immediately common goods 
besides that of friendship. 
In "Cross-Purposes" , Taylor argues that there are 
immediately common goods in modern societies ( 1989a, 17 2-
6). They are not only relevant to but also important to 
and s t i l l active in the moral and pol i t ical l i f e . He 
points out that in the Watergate and Iran-Contra 
misdemeanours, the Americans responded out of their 
feeling that the republic, the constitution and the rule 
of law, which they treasured and saw as the common bulwark 
of their freedom, were jeopardized. They were not 
motivated by their calculation of personal goals . In 
fact , most Americans responded in the events would not 
have benefited. Rather, for Taylor, they were motivated 
by a "patriotic ident i f icat ion". They identif ied 
themselves with the republic, seeing the history of which 
as their common history. Their responses in the events , 
either through the media or picketing, were common actions 
in the strong, dialogi cal sense . These common actions 
surely did constitute the common good of patriotism and 
the common project of an active republic. For Taylor, 
patriotism is an active common good which had motivated 
and s t i l l motivates the Americans to take actions . 
If Taylor is correct, we can see how important the 
immediately common goods are to pol i t ica l l i f e . Once a 
c、 
person performs the common actions to pursue the goods 
虞' 
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(internal or of performance) of a . common project 
(mediately or immediately) , he immediately assumes a 
common identity with other participants in that project . 
They identify themselves with their fellow citizens as a 
community or a nation. They call themselves "we", and 
their common identity may be called
 n
we-identity". In 
this way, common goods not only motivate us to take common 
actions to carry out the common projects but also motivate 
us to take common actions to safeguard our common 
identi ty. In other words , common goods and common actions 
are the necessary conditions of common ident i ty. 
Taylor's strategy is to argue from our moral aad 
pol i t ica l experiences . He asks whether we share a common 
identi ty. If we do, then there mus t be certain common 
goods among us, although we may not know or cannot 
ar t iculate them. If we do not, then we would not have 
shared a common identi ty. 
His argument , however, faces certain d i f f i cu l t i e s . 
Liberals would query that to what extent we share a common 
ident i ty. It depends on the meaning of the personal 
pronoun "we". If i t means all members of a society, then 
to argue that we share a common identi ty seems to 
contradict our common sense . It is because our society 
has different sectors, such as different classes, 
different sub-cultures , etc. We often identify ourselves 
with these sectors rather than with the society as a 
whole. If "we" means small groups of people, such as 
circles of friends, members of a country club or a sogcer 
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team and a symphony orchestra, then i t seems possible that 
each of these groups has a common identi ty. And i t is 
also possible that a part icular person who participates in 
different groups at the same time may share more than one 
common identity with members of different groups . But i t 
does not follow that a l l members of a society, who belong 
to different groups, share one common identi ty. Even if 
every group has certain common goods, each common good is 
attached to by different groups of-people . That is , these 
common goods are chosen by different people . A good 
be comes common to a part icular group is only the upshot of 
individual choices . Goods are not common to a society as 
a who 1 e if they are not chosen by al l members of the 
眷 
society. Even if there is a society whose members have 
chosen a common good and hence assumed a common identity, 
i t is merely a happy accident . The individual identity of 
every member s t i l l remains prior to the common identity 
because the common identi ty depends on individual choices . 
As a consequence, individuals may choose to give up the 
common good and the common identity as well. In the final 
analysis, the basic principles of justice of a society 
does not need to incorporate common goods . 
I think communitarians would reply in the foi l owing 
way. Members of a society in fact share a common 
ident i ty . We fa i l to recognize this common identity 
because we fa i l to perceive ours elves as situated in and 
d e e p l y a f f e c t e d by o u r s i t u a t i o n s (wh i ch i n c l u d e s t h e 
common goods) . To perceive ourselves as situated in and 
•， 
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‘deeply affected by certain common goods implies that i t 
may not be our voluntary choice to participate in these 
common goods . Rather, to participate in common goods is 
our condition. That is , i t makes possible our se l f -
identity as a social being. It follows that we cannot get 
rid of the common goods and are sharing a common identi ty, 
a we-identity. The individual identity, that is , the I -
identity, is by no means prior to the we — identity. This 
argument seems stronger than Taylor's above . This 
stronger argument is the third point about "common good"， 




THE SELF AND COMMON GOODS 
I shall question the extent to which the self is 
constituted by the common goods . By "constitute" I mean 
that if X is constituted by Y, then X is impossible 
without Y ； or, to put i t the other way round, i t means 
that Y makes X possible . This chapter is divided into 
four sections. In the f i r s t section, I shall distinguish 
two m e a n i n g s of " s e l f " . Then , i n t h e second section, the 
theory of the 
unencumbered self which sees the self as 
p r i m a r i l y or a n t e c e d e n t l y i n d i v i d u a t e d w i l l be 
reconstructed. Thirdly, I shall maintain that the self is 
situated in and deeply affected by some given but 
unreflected ends . Some of these unreflected given ends 
are, as I shall argue in the final section, common goods. 
And hence we are sharing at least a "potential" we-
ident i ty . This we~identity and the I - ident i ty together 
form our se1f-identi ty. Therefore , I shall conclude that 
i t is this complex structure of se l f - ident i ty which is 
constituted by the common goods . 
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What: i s t h e S e l f ? 
1. There are two meanings of "self". The f i r s t refers 
to the understanding of one's identity (or se l f - iden t i ty ) . 
It concerns the ordinary persons who are socially 
situated. We are situated in certain social relations 
with our relat ives, friends , neighbours, colleagues, etc. 
We take up some roles, jobs, interests and so on. We like 
or dislike some forms of l i fe or act iv i t ies . We adhere to 
one set or another of values or standards of evaluation. 
Further, how we understand and evaluate other people and 
the world is more or less affected by these relat ions, 
roles, forms of l i fe and standards to which we attach. I 
call al l these things together our "surrounding si tuation" 
or s imply "s i tuat ion". 
The problem of one's identity arises when one asks 
the kind of question such as "Who am I?" or "What kind of 
person am I?" Asking this kind of question is by no means 
i r r a t i o n a l bu t i s r a t h e r common ( i n t h e s e n s e of p o p u l a r ) 
t o o r d i n a r y p e o p l e .
1
 ( T h i s k i n d of i n q u i r y o r s e a r c h i n g 
for one's se1f-identity has a variety of names , for 
example, "sel f - ref lect ion" , "self-understanding", "se l f -
discovery" or "self-examination" . I see al l these terms 
as synonyms and shall use the term "self - reflection,
1
 in 
the following discussions for the sake of convenience and 
c la r i ty . ) By asking these questions , one t r ies to 
1
 This kind of inquiry has entered into, perhaps has already 
become an important element of, the popular culture. For example, 
there is a pop song titled "Out Here on My Own" from a Hollywood movie 
"Fame" in the 80, s. It goes： "Sometimes I wonder where I've been,, who 
I am, do I fi t in ...". 
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identify or to pick out his characteristics so as to gain 
a deeper understanding of himself. Of course, questions 
like "Who is he/she ?" serve the same purpose to identify 
someone who is socially situated. 
We identify or d i s t in g u i s h someone through his 
s i tuat ion. That is , we say he belongs to a particular 
group or class of persons ； or he is different in some 
respects from others . We may even know his character by 
knowing how he evaluates other persons or things . In 
other words , one's s e 1 f-ide n t i t y may be articulated by-
l i s t ing a series of descriptions about his relations with 
others , his roles, goals and standards of evaluation and 
so on. Of course, these descriptions must be about 
something that are significant or make sense for him and 
for us . For example, we would not include something like 
"he has 3,732 hairs on his head" as a description about 
his sel f - ident i ty (Taylor 1992, 35-6) . Let us take an 
imaginary example of a young mafia named M for 
i l l u s t r a t ion . Suppose a police off icer , the inquirer, is 
looking for M. Obviously, te l l ing his name is not enough 
because i t is ridiculous to say that the police off icer 
would know M personally just by knowing his name . It is 
even not possible for the police officer to identify or 
catch him with his name alone . The inquirer may want you 
to te l l something more about M, such as "where he lives
M
 , 
"he is the son of so and so", "he is the brother of so and 
so", "he has a scar on his face", "he is offensive and 
cruel", etc. Legally, these information are enough for 
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the police to identify him and for the court to summon 
him. In the moral aspect, however, these information are 
not enough to know him yet'. These are not enough for 
others (his friends or a social worker or a pr iest , for 
instance) who try to understand or help him. They may-
want to know more, such a s his character, his profess ion 
(a mafia unfortunately) and his l i f e history. This kind 
of inquiry would turn so deep especially when the inquirer 
is M himself, that is , when he is reflecting on himself. 
He would not be sa t is f ied with al l the above l i s ted 
information if he is sincerely searching for his s e l f -
identi ty. He would want to understand who he is by-
inquiring into the ends or goods he once committed to and 
continues to commit to, or what he thinks to be important 
for him now and for his future . Only if he acquires these 
kinds of knowledge, he may be said to know his authentic 
se l f - ident i ty . Thus , one's se l f - ident i ty is related not 
only to his social roles, relations , etc. but also to his 
deeply committed, sometimes unaware of, goods . 
2. The word "identity" is somewhat misleading. It may 
induce someone to associate "sel f - ident i ty" with the 
problem of personal identity in the special branches of 
philosophy, namely, metaphysics and philosophy of mind.
2 
But I do not mean th is . It seems useful to digress a 
l i t t l e bit here to make clear the dist inction between the 
c For instance, Caney argues that Sandel oscillates between two 
senses of personal identity, namely, the metaphysical and , the 
psychological senses (Caney 1991). 
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problems of personal identity and of se l f - ident i ty . The 
problem of personal identity is concerned with the general 
cr i te r ia of the continuity of any person and of the 
dist inction between persons . The problem of se l f -
identi ty, on the other hand, inquires into the 
• distinguishing characteristics or t r a i t s of particular 
ordinary persons, who 
engagG in certain relations and 
roles and goals, so that they can be identified .or 
distinguished. In short, these problems have different 
subject matters. For the l a t t e r , i t s subject matter is 
t h e o r d i n a r y , s o c i a l l y s i t u a t e d p e r s o n s w h i l e t h a t o f t h e 
f o r m e r i s t h e p e r s o n i n g e n e r a l . 
I t would be objected that se l f - ident i ty must 
presuppose personal identity (or the continuity of a 
person) . For example, if I am not sure whether a person, 
who is named A, in front of me here and 
now is the same 
p e r s o n A I saw y e s t e r d a y and w i l l c o n t i n u a l l y be t h e same 
person A in the future, then how can I say he is a 
particular and unique person distinguishable from others ? 
How can I identify him by appealing to a part icular set of 
characterist ics or t r a i t s which is thought to belong to a 
person named A? This objection is s ignif icant . The 
continuity of a person needs to be reassured beforehand if 
I endorse the claim that the self is s i tuated, or even 
constituted, by i t s s i tuat ion. 
It is usually thought that the self must be something 
certain and unaffectable by i ts s i tuation . If the self 
otherwise changes from time to time, i t loses i t s 
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continuity. This unchangeable "thing" may be either the 
mind or the body. (This idea is closely connected to the 
second sense of "self", which I shall explicate soon .) 
But for communitarians , the continuity of the self rests 
on none of these things . ：‘' Rather, i t bases on the 
narrative or l i fe history of the particular person 
' concerned (Maclntyre 1981, 33-5, 211-20). In his 
crit icism of the modern understanding of the se l f , 
M a c l n t y r e a r gue s t h a t t he s e l f has a h i s t o r i c a l d i m e n s i o n . 
To assume a social role or a point of view of evaluation 
i s to commit o n e s e l f to c e r t a i n mora l commitments . The 
s e l f , a s i t i s conce i v ed by modern p eop l e ^ i s p o s s i b l e t o 
change i t s role as well as to choose and to shif t i t s 
mora l p o i n t of v iew f rom t ime t o t i m e as i f i t ha s no 
history of moral commitments. Maclntyre does not mean, I 
think, that the self should not or could not change i t s 
role or moral point of view. Rather , i t may take these 
changes and in fact does often change i t s position. What 
matters here is: a l l the changes in the history of one's 
self would not go away without any trace . On the 
contrary, argues Maclntyre, the self is never 
unconstrained by i t s past choices or moral commitments . 
One's l i f e history is the record of his past moral 
commitments. This record does constrain his next choice 
and future actions . Thus , " [t]o know oneself as such a 
social person is however not to occupy a s ta t ic and fixed 
posit ion. It is to find oneself placed at a certain point 
on a journey with set goals' (1981, 34). The l i f e history 
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of oneself reveals the continuity or discontinuity of his 
moral commitments . 11 is this l i fe history, rather than 
the continuity of his mind or body, that constitutes the 
continuity of his self through time. 
Maclntyre calls this view of continuity the "narrative 
% 
unity of the self" . 
By invoking Maclntyre's narrative unity of the sel f , 
I do not mean to claim that he has solved once and for a l l 
the problem of personal identi ty. Instead, I think his 
argument points to a possible way out only. Nevertheless , 
his argument has two, at least , advantages . First , i t 
avoids the rejection of the continuity of a person in the 
cases involving the sudden change in one's se l f , such as 
religious conversion (Saul's becoming Paul) (Rawls 1993, 
31), migration (Jozef Korzeniowske's becoming Joseph 
Conrad) (Caney 1991, 162) and the mafia who turns into a 
priest . Second, in view of the narrative unity of the 
se l f , to accept the objection that se l f - ident i ty must 
presuppose personal identity does not commit me to accept 
that the self must be something certain and unchangeable . 
Hence, personal identity and se l f - ident i ty are separate 
but non-conflicting issues. 
3. In the above explication of Maclntyre ' s argument, I 
have already invoked the second meaning of "self". It 
denotes the reflecting subject in se l f - r e f l ec t ion. The 
notion of the self arises in se l f - re f lec t ion . Most people 
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would have this kind of experience. When one is 
reflecting on himself, either doubting whether he exists 
or wondering who he is , he would probably perceive a 
picture： there is a subject reflecting on an object. 
Walzer points out in Interpretation and Social Criticism 
that the word "self" in " se1f — criticisro" refers to both 
the subject and the object of the activity of se l f -
criticism (1987 , 35 ) . Likewise, the word "self" in "self-
reflection" refers at the same time to both the subject 
and the object of the activity of self - ref lect ion. We 
incline to conclude that the subject and the object are 
separate and distinct enti t ies . The subject of reflection 
is often thought of as the self or mind whereas the object 
of reflection is thought of as either the body or the 
collection of i ts experiences, memories and so on. The 
Cartesian doubt is an exemplar of this model of self — 
reflection. And i t gave birth to the subject-object 
dichotomy which has dominated the epistemologica1 
tradition in modern philosophy for centuries . For 
rat ional is ts , the subject is a thinking substance 
separated from the body. When i t come s to Kant, the 
s u b j e c t i s a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e n t i t y moving not in t h e 
empirical world but in the inte l l ig ible world. For 
empiricists, on the contrary, t h ey could not find any 
thing beyond this empirical world. Hence, they infer, the 




of them think the self is only the collection of one's 
• . . . 3 
memories whereas others think it is the brain. 
This centuries-long dispute between the rat ional is ts 
and the empiricists is , of course, not my concern here . 
But i t nevertheless reflects the meaning of "self" 
employed in contemporary moral and poli t ical philosophy. 
According to the subject-object dichotomy, the objects of 
self-ref lect ion are one's body, roles, ends , relations 
with others , etc . The socially situated ordinary person 
is thus the collection of all these things . On the other 
hand , the subject of se1f-ref1ection is detachable from 
and unaffected by these objects . Therefore, only the 
subject is regarded as the self . 
This meaning of "self" is epistemological and 
me taphys i cal. It is epistemological because i t concerns 
how we reflect or perceive our goods , roles , etc. It is 
metaphysical because i t sees the self as the subject of 
reflect ion. This subject is different from the objects in 
nature . The self is hence conceived as dist inct from the 
socially situated ordinary person. But by this I do not 
mean the self must be moving in an in te l l ig ible world. 
Later, we will see that the Rawls ian self is regarded as 
one which moves in the empirical world. 
In the rest of this essay, I shall use the terms 
"one's self- ident i ty" , "my self- ident i ty", "our se l f -
identity" , etc. to refer to the f i r s t meaning of 丨 ,self". 
That means , these terms denote the identity (or se l f -
1
 For discussions of personal identity, see Perry 1975. 
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identity) of socially situated ordinary persons . And I 
shall use the terms "the self", "one's self" , "my self" , 
"our selves", etc. to denote the second meaning of "self", 
that is , the reflecting subject. 
T h e U n e n c u m b e r e d S e l f 
It is an undeniable fact that we are situated in 
certain relations with others , engaging in certain roles 
and goods. Even l iberals would accept this claim. For 
example, Kymlicka says , " . . . no one disagrees that tasks 
and projects [that is , our ends ] have to be our primary 
concern and goal . . . " ( 1989a, 50). However , the question 
of how deep or how slight we are situated in or affected 
by our situation is by no means beyond dispute. Both 
l iberals and communitarians have different opinions on 
this issue. For l iberals , only the person of oneself 
(that is the f i r s t meaning of "self") is affected. It is 
because they would hold that part of oneself the 
subject is detachable from i t s s i tuat ion. As we are 
capable of reflect ing on and shif t ing between our ends , 
our selves as reflect ing subjects are capable of detaching 
from our ends . However, the "subject" in contemporary 
l iberal pol i t ica l theory is more than a subject of 
perception or ref lect ion. It has been systematically 
explicated in Sande1 ' s reconstruction of Rawls ' theory of 
the self the unencumbered se l f」 
‘
 4
 Whether Rawls himself really presupposes this view of the self 
in A Theory of Justice is debatable. Rawls himself denies it in his 
later works. Kymlicka also defends him against Sandel's attack. I 
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Sandel argues that Rawls' theory of justice 
presupposes a theory of the self (in the second sense of 
"self")——the "unencumbered self" (1982). This theory 
holds that the self is prior to i ts ends or goods (I use 
the terms "end" and "good" interchangeably). It is simply 
called the priority of the self . In three different 
senses the self is prior to i t s ends； or, we may say the 
Rawlsian self has three different aspects . 
First , the self is conceived as completely separated 
from the ends . It is the subject of possession possessing 
the ends while the ends, on the other hand, are the 
objects of possession or of desire. The self is 
detachable from i ts ends at any time because the ends are 
Viewed as the a t t r i b u t e s i n s t e a d of the c o n s t i t u e n t s of 
the se l f . 
The meanings of "attribute" and "constituent" of the 
self may be distinguished through the contrast of "I have" 
and "I am" (Sandel 1982, 20-21). If I identify myself 
with certain ends (say, X, Y and Z) or I deeply commit to 
them so t h a t I say " I am X, Y and Z" , then t h e s e t h i n g s 
form part of me and may be seen as the "constituents" of 
my self . Or I may be described as possessed by or 
obsessed with X, Y and Z. The change of these 
constituents would result in the change of my self . For 
shall come to Kymlicka's defense soon. However, as this view is quite 
popular now, it is worth examining here. For the time being, I 
bracket the question whether Rawls must presuppose this view. I 
continue to call it "Rawlsian self" or "unencumbered self" simply 
because I want to follow the terminology started by Sandel. However, 
I prefer the term "Rawlsian self" to "unencumbered self" for the 
latter suggests only one aspect of this view of the self. 
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example, I may say "I am generous , healthy and 
trustworthy". If I were no more generous , becoming 
unhealthy or less trustworthy, then i t would amount to the 
change of my self . I would then no longer be the same 
person or might be described as having changed into 
another kind of person . On the other hand, I may identify 
some goods (say, A, B and C) as the objects of my desires . 
It means that I do not deeply commit to and am not 
possessed by them. Rather, I am the possessor of A, B and 
C. The change of them would never result in any change of 
my self . In this case, I would say "I ha ve A, B and C" 
instead of "I am A, B and C". We may call this kinds of 
ends or objects of desires "at t r ibutes". For example, I 
may describe myself as having a generous soul, a healthy 
physique or psychology and a trustworthy character. Even 
if 工 lost al l these a t t r ibutes , I would not think I were 
no longer the same person or the same sel f . It is 
important to note that "at tr ibutes" and "constituents" are 
relative terms . Constituents, though are deeply committed 
to, may be reflected on and hence become at t r ibutes of the 
self so that the agent becomes "dispossessed" . Thus 
writes Sandel, 
When I am able to ref lect on my obsession, able to 
pick i t out and make i t an object of my reflect ion, 
I thereby establish a certain space between it and 
me, and so diminish i t s hold. It becomes more an 
at tr ibute and less a constituent of my identi ty, and 
so dissolves from an obsess ion to a mere desire 
(1982, 58). 
It follows that whether an end is an a t t r ibute or a 
constituent of oneself depends on one's se l f - re f lec t ion . 
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The Rawls ian theory of the self sees the relation 
between the self and i t s ends as the second kind, that is , 
as the subject of possession possessing or desiring to 
possess some at t r ibutes which may be attached to or given 
up without any change in the subject. Thus , a person can 
never fully be affected by his at t r ibutes , and the 
continuity of the person cannot be jeopardized. 
To put this f i r s t aspect of the Rawls ian self in 
another way. The self is seen as a "substrate" standing 
behind the socially situated person. But this substrate 
does not belong to an in te l l ig ible world. According to 
Sandel, Rawls has to avoid the Kantian or ideal is t dual-
world theory so as to bring his theory of the self in line 
with the Anglo-American empiricist t radit ion of 
philosophy. Therefore , the Rawls ian self or substrate 
cannot be a transcendental subject moving in an 
in te l l ig ib le world. Rather, i t can only be a subject of 
possession moving in the empirical world. Analogous to a 
ba skgt or 3. container, the self is the possessor holding 
together al l his a t t r ibutes , relations , desires, ends , 
etc • It is in this sense that the Rawlsian self fa l l s 
somewhere between the ra t ional is t and the empiricist views 
(Sandel 1982, 13-4). 
The other aspects of the Rawlsian self stem from the 
f i r s t . The second one is that the self is s den as a 
subject of voluntary choice which chooses the ends or 
a t t r ibutes . According to the f i r s t aspect, the self and 
i t s ends are primarily separated. Their relation, is 
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established by means of the se l f ' s act of choice, that is 
by the exercise of one's will . The self is understood as 
n
a sovereign agent of choice, a creature whose ends are 
chosen rather than given, who comes by his aims and 
purposes by acts of will “ ：‘' (Sandel 1982 , 22). We are 
assumed to have the moral powers of choice, that is , the 
powers to form, revise and pursue our own conceptions of 
the good. In other words , these moral powers are the 
constituents of the self . The more we exercise these 
powers , the more we realize our selves . Hence, the 
freedom of exercising these moral powers (our freedom of 
choice, freedom of having our conceptions of the good, and 
so on) must be protected ； otherwise, i t is detrimental to 
our selves . These freedoms are protected by the basic 
principles of the social inst i tut ions so that they become 
our basic and inviolable rights and l iber t ies . 
The third aspect of the Rawlsian self is about the 
identity of the self . Since the constituents of the self 
are the moral powers of choice, the identi ty of the 
Rawlsian self is thus defined in terms of i t s moral powers 
of choice instead of i t s at tr ibutes or the ends i t commits 
to. Because of this , Sandel argues that the Rawlsian self 
is "antecedently individuated" ( 1982 , 59-65 ) . The self is 
antecedently individuated because the moral powers of 
choice are thought to be possessed by individual selves 
instead of by any collection of selves, such as a 
community or a family. In order to exercise these moral 
powers freely, every individual self must be independent 
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of other people and from the influence of i t s situation as 
well. As a consequence, the basic rights and l iber t ies to 
protect the freedom of exercising the moral powers of 
choice are said to belong to individual persons. And 
hence,
 M
[t]he essential unity of the self is already 
provided by the conception of right" (Rawls 19 71, 5 63). 
Since one's se l f - ident i ty is defined in terms of the 
individual 's mora 1 powers instead of his s i tuat ion, one
1
 s 
se l f - ident i ty is hence primarily viewed as an I - iden t i ty . 
Only when one voluntarily chooses to take up certain goals 
or to participate in certain projects with others, he is 
said to have acquired the common ident i ty , the we-
ident i ty . This means that even if someone has 
participated in certain common projects , has taken some 
common actions, and has identif ied himself with others, 
but the common identity that he has assumed is s t i l l 
excluded from and does not form part of his s e l f - i d e n t i t y . 
His se l f - ident i ty , in other words, must be an I一identity. 
And hence the we-identi ty he voluntarily takes up is 
secondary to the I一identity and is detachable. 
Tl i e S i t u a t e d S e l f 
1. Communitarians do not accept the theory of the 
unencumbered self . They argue to the contrary that the 
se l f , as a subject of ref lect ion and of possession, is 
nevertheless situated in and deeply affected by i t s 
s i t u a t i o n . However, I do no t mean t h a t c o m m u n i t a r i a n s 
disagree with l iberals on every aspect of the Rawls ian 
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self . Rather, the i r opinions converge on many points . 
This is evidenced from Kymlicka's defense of the Rawlsian 
self (1989a, 47-73)」Their major discrepancy is: to what 
extent is the self situated in and affected by i ts 
situation (which includes the common goods)? In what 
follows, I shall work out the communi tarian answer to this 
question by examining the three aspects of the Rawls ian 
self . 
According to the f i r s t aspect of the Rawls ian self , 
the s e l f i s unencumbered by i t s ends . That means, the 
self as a subject of possession is unaffected by i t s ends . 
I t i m p l i e s t h a t t he s e l f and the ends a r e a lways keep ing 
a "distance". I think communitarians would agree that 
there may be a certain distance between the self and i ts 
ends. However, they would argue： (1) that this distance 
is only a reflective distance； (2) that the distance is 
flexible rather than fixed； and (3) that the se l f ' s 
keeping a reflective distance does not imply that the self 
is unaffected. This argument is closely related to the 
argument against the second aspect of the Rawls ian self . 
Therefore, i t is necessary to reconstruct the la t ter 
argument beforehand； otherwise, we cannot grasp the former 
one . 
5
 Rawls endorses Kymlicka's defence in his Political Liberalism. 
He writes, "I believe the reply found in chap. 4 of Will kymlicka's 
Liberalism, Communi ty, and Cul ture … i s on the whole satisfactory 
..."(1993, 27n29). Kyml i cka's defence has five parts. Each part 
criticises different communitarians. (But some of them are not 
generally regarded as communitarians, such as Rorty and Unger.) For 
a complete list of these parts, see 1989a, 47. My reconstruction of 
his defence below will draw mainly from the first (on Taylor), second 
(on Sandel) and third (on Sandel and Maclntyre) parts (1989a, 47-61). 
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According to the second aspect of the Rawlsian se l f , 
the relation between the self and i t s ends, which is one 
of possession the subject possesses i t s objects, is the 
‘ V 
upshot of the subject 's voluntary choice. For Sandel, 
however, this notion of self-ends relation is only one of 
the two alternative notions of human agency. By "human 
agency" he means "the faculty by which the self comes by-
i t s ends" (1982, 57-8). He calls the f i r s t notion of 
human agency "voluntarist notion" while the second 
"cognitive notion". According to the second notion, one's 
ends are not obtained by his voluntary choice but are 
"given" antecedently. One comes to be aware of his given 
ends by "discovery", by "finding them out" (1982, 58). 
These notions of human agency are not contradictory. 
Rather, I think both of them are correct in some respects . 
They t e l l us about different kinds of ends present in 
one's l i f e . The ends in the f i r s t notion are the objects 
of our choice and are detachable while those in the second 
notion are something given, not voluntarily chosen. In 
fact , i t contradicts our common sense if someone claims 
that all our ends are given. In our daily l i f e , we always 
make choices . However, i t is also true that we do commit 
to some values, habits, etc. without voluntarily choosing 
them. We call these "given ends
M
. For example, most of 
us believe that having more money is better and te l l ing 
l ies is bad. But i t is important to note that we had 
never chosen this kind of beliefs at the outset . They 
were given to us somehow, for instance, through 
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socialization or cultural inheritance. So, communitarians 
would not deny the voluntarist notion. They claim only 
that the will, the moral powers of choice, alone is not 
enough for searching one's se1f-identity (Sandel 1982, 
152). In short, there are' both kinds of ends which are 
obtained by us with different capacities . 
If both chosen and given ends are present in our 
l i f e , then we may ask another question： are both kinds of 
ends objects of reflection? This question is of prior 
importance because if i t s answer is affirmative, i t seems 
to imply that the self must be distanced from i ts ends . 
Let us consider the chosen ends f i r s t . Obviously, chosen 
ends must be reflected or evaluated or at least 
contemplated by us； otherwise, we could not have chosen 
them. On the other hand, given ends may be either 
reflected or unreflected. According to the cognitive 
notion of human agency, given ends may be discovered or 
found out by us . As remarked by Sandel, "reflexivity is 
a distancing faculty" (1982, 58), so to ref lect is to 
distance one self from the end i t reflecting on. Since 
communitarians would not and do not deny our capacity for 
ref lect ion, i t is apparent that they would and must agree 
that there is a reflect ive distance between the self and 
i t s given ends . However, this reflective distance would 
collapse if one never ref lects on his given ends . 
The reflective distance between the self and i ts ends 
is f lexible . Like chosen ends, reflected given ends are 
kept in a reflective distance from the se l f . The deeper 
87 、 
they are reflected on, the farther they are distanced from 
the se l f , and the more likely they are becoming mere 
a t t r ibutes . On the other hand, unreflected given ends are 
taken for granted. Since they are unreflected,. the 
distance between them and the self collapses . This 
amounts to saying that the unreflected given ends are the 
constituents of the self , that they constitute the self . 
However, all ends, either given or chosen, are possible 
objects of reflect ion. Even the constituents of the self 
may also be reflected so that one may break away from his 
obsessions . To give up or to maintain a farther distance 
from such an unreflected given end would result in a 
change of one's self , changing the kind of person he is . 
L ike t h e d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n t h e s e l f and i t s e n d s , t h e 
bounds of the self are flexible too. When one ref lects on 
his ends, he is trying to sort out which end is his 
deepest commitment or constituent, which end is taken for 
granted but must maintain a longer distance, and which end 
is a mere at tr ibute of his se l f . Through this se l f -
ref lect ion, he may acquire a deeper understanding of his 
self (Sandel 1982, 58-9, 152-3). On the other hand, the 
voluntarist notion sees the self as antecedently 
constituted by the moral powers of choice . I ts ends are 
regarded as i t s mere a t t r ibutes . The bounds of the self 
and i t s relation to i t s ends are fixed, that is , either 
attached to or detached from i t s ends . Since the self is 
nothing but the moral powers , a l l selves are the same and 
are without difference , character and depth. Also, s^ i n c e 
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the self is constituted by the moral powers and has 
nothing to be reflected on, i t can reflect only on i t s 
a t t r i b u t e s . 
To sum up, for communitarians , admitting that there 
a r e g i v e n e n d s a n d t h a t t h e s e l f i s d e e p l y a f f e c t e d b y 
t h e s e g i v e n e n d s a r e t h e n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s o f s e l f -
reflection . By "deeply affected" I mean that although we 
are unaware of some given ends (and hence unreflected on 
them>, we nevertheless attach to and sometimes make use of 
t h e m t o s e e a n d t o e v a l u a t e t h e w o r l d a n d o t h e r s . T h i s 
implies that the second aspect of the Rawlsian se l f , that 
the self voluntarily chooses to possess i t s ends, need to 
b e a m e n d e d ( n o t t o b e a b a n d o n e d ) . 
If both chosen and given ends are possible objects of 
reflection and may be distanced from the se l f , does i t 
follow that the self is unaffected by any ends ? 
2. Liberals would agree with communitarians: (1) that 
there are given ends ； and (2) that we are situated in and 
affected by these given (sometimes unreflected) ends 
(Kymlicka 1989a, 50-1) . But they would maintain that 
since all given ends are possible objects of ref lect ion, 
and since to ref lect on an end is to establish a distance 
from the end, thus even unreflected given ends (whether 
they are the constituents or a t t r ibutes of one's self) are 
in principle detachable . 
For Kyml icka , what i s i m p o r t a n t and c e n t r a l t o 
liberalism, and is held dearly by us, is that we, are 
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always capable of re-examining and revising our ends, 
however deep and dear we held these ends . And to 
understand our selves as prior to our ends means "that no 
end or goal is exempt from possible re-examination" 
(1989a, 52). This kind of self-examination (or se l f -
reflect ion) enables oneself to envisage his self as 
detachable from his present ends so that he can compare 
them with other ends to see which of them is more valuable 
to him, and hence to choose new ends or to revise his 
present ends . In short, to detach one's self (or to 
maintain a distance) from the ends is a necessary 
condition of se l f - ref lec t ion . In contrast, to argue that 
someone's t r a i t s or ends as the constituents of his self 
would violate or foreclose the very possibi l i ty of se l f -
examination and the abi l i ty to revise his ends . 
Kymlicka argues that it is possible, and indeed 
usual, for us to "find ourselves in various roles and 
relationships , but we may not like what we find. The 
roles and relations may be oppressive or demeaning" 
( 1989a, 54) . However, he finds Sandel's view of the self 
implies that we cannot revise or "reject entirely" our 
ends or values, practices or ways of l i f e even if we find 
them "inherently t r i v i a l or even degrading" (1989a, 5 7). 
For instance , 
A C h r i s t i a n h o u s e w i f e i n a monogamous, h e t e r o s e x u a l 
m a r r i a g e can i n t e r p r e t what i t means t o be a 
Christian, or a housewife - she can interpret the 
meaning of these shared religious, economic, and 
sexual practices . But she can't stand back and 
d e c i d e t h a t she d o e s n ' t wan t t o be a C h r i s t i a n a t 
a]. 1 , or a housewife ( 1989a, 5 7). # 
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Hence, the kind of self-discovery which is suggested by 
the cognitive notion of human agency provides us with no 
exit from our past wrong decisions or wrong convictions . 
Kymli cka's objection is partly correct and partly 
wrong. It is correct in the sense that i t accounts for 
the requirement of a ref lect ive distance between the self 
and i t s ends . Even for communitarians , they would not 
disagree with him on this point . As I have pointed out 
ear l ie r , Sandel thinks even the given ends, the 
constituents of one's se l f , are possible objects of 
ref lect ion. In short, the self as a subject of se l f -
reflection is in principle detachable from its ends 
(either given or chosen). 
On the other hand, Kymlicka's objection is wrong 
because Sandel
 1
 s argument does not imply the claim that 
some degrading ends or ways of l i f e cannot be rejected 
ent irely. Whether these degrading ends or ways of l i f e 
can be rejected entirely, for communitarians , depends on 
how deep we reflect on them. As we have noted above , the 
deeper one ref lects , the farther he is away from the ends 
on which he ref lects . So, i t is not the case that 
Sandel's argument forecloses self-examination. And the 
Christian housewife in Kymli cka ' s example is by no means 
"can't stand back and decide that she doesn't want to be 
a Christian at a l l , or a housewife
M
. 
Therefore, communitarians would agree on the one hand 
that every end is in principle detachable whereas they 
would maintain, on the other hand, that the self is in 
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fact always deeply affected by i t ends , and thus the 
distance between i t and i ts ends always collapses because 
most of the time we fa i l to reflect on ourselves . 
To put i n a d i f f e r e n t way. The r e a l d i f f e r e n c e 
between liberals and communitarians is neither (1) whether 
the self is uns i tuated ； nor (2) whether the self is 
unaffected by i t s present ends (either reflected or not); 
but (3) whether the self is completely unaffected by i ts 
past commitments, that refers to those ends which were 
once committed to but have been dropped or detached by the 
se l f . 
I think the f i r s t question is rather naive . To say 
the self is uns i tuated is to say that the self is able to 
maintain an "absolute distance" not only from the ends 
being reflected but also from all possible ends . It 
implies that a person is total ly uninterested in all 
things, takes no role, standard or value, participates in 
no relation with others, etc. This "person" not only 
contradicts our common sense but also is completely 
unimaginable . Therefore , l iberals would not take this 
position. As to the second question, i t seems plain that 
neither liberals nor communitarians would deny the fact 
that we are affected by our present ends . As Kyml icka 
asserts , 
[o ] f course in making that judgement [about our tasks 
or ends], we must take something as a 'given'； 
someone who is nothing but a free rational being or 
a freely creative being would have no reason to 
choose one way of l i f e over another (1989a, 51). 
92 
3. Now, let us go to the question： is the self 
completely unaffected by i ts past ends or commitments? 
Communitarians ' answer would be: no. If the self is not 
completely unaffected, i t follows that there i.s no 
completely unconstrained reflection and choice. My 
argument for communitarians s imply appeals to our common 
sense and experience . 
To say the self is completely unaffected by i t s past 
commitments brings us back to the f i r s t aspect of the 
Rawl s i an self again. This aspect sees the self as a 
possessor, a container of i ts ends . It a 1lows only two 
possible relations between the self and i t s ends, either 
possession (or attaching) or dispossession (or detaching). 
However, i t seems to contradict our common sense that we 
are always affected by our past experience and decisions . 
For example, a person who chose to be come a priest many 
years ago. He took up the l i fe form of a priest and saw 
this l i f e form as something good for him. Now, he decides 
to give i t up. Inst i tut ional ly, he may be discharged from 
h i s d u t i e s once he l e a v e s t h e o f f i c e of a p r i e s t . 
M o r a l l y , h oweve r , he i s s t i l l a f f e c t e d by t h e r e l i g i o u s 
beliefs and convictions he once held deeply. These 
beliefs have shaped and will continually shape his future . 
Therefore, the self is not and cannot be to ta l ly analogous 
to a possessor or a container. On the one hand, like a 
container, the subject may possess or dispossess some 
roles or values or ends . On the other hand, unlike a 
container, which may not be affected by the things it , once 
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contained, the subject cannot dispossess any role or value 
or end without any trace, without any influence of them. 
In short, the self as a subject cannot be detached from 
i t s objects of possession completely. That means, when a 
person gives up some ends' or goods, his self is not 
unaffected by or disconnected to them, unlike a white-
board being cleaned . 
Our past commitments always constrain our later 
decisions or choices because they shape our understanding 
of the alternatives . It may be put in a rather formal 
way. Say, my commitment C| at time t| affects (or shapes) 
my understanding of prospective commitments Cj, C3, C^  and 
so on at time t�， so that I take up C � a t that time . 
Similarly, Cj and C� affect my understanding of other 
prospective commitments at time t^  and so on and so forth. 
This kind of continuous influence from our past 
commitments may carry on for a very long time. 
Liberals would probably complain that to argue for 
such a kind of continuous influence from our past 
commitments would allow us with no way out of our past 
wrong beliefs, wrong commitments or wrong doings . This 
objection causes no d i f f i cu l ty to communitarians . The 
influence of past commitments is continuing but is also 
diminishing. That means, the effect of C^  is diminishing 
unt i l i t s fading out at tQ so that my commitments at tQ and 
thereafter will not be influenced by Cj This explains why 
i t usually takes a long time for us to discover our faults 
or wrong-doings or false beliefs . It is also the reason 
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why kids will not find their conducts stupid or childish 
until they get older. The speed of diminishing influence 
depends on our reflective capacities . When we are 
reflecting on ourselves, searching for our unreflected 
(either given or chosen) ends' and past commitments, we are 
voluntarily establishing a distance from them. To 
establish a reflective distance is to accelerate the 
diminishing influence of one's past commitments. 
Sometimes , the influence of past commitments would stop 
suddenly, just like the case of the change of Saul of 
Tarsus to Paul the Apostle. This kind of sudden change is 
the upshot of deep se l f - ref lec t ion or strong evaluation 
rather than of any mysterious force. 
To conclude, since our past commitments affect our 
later decisions and choices, there is no unconstrained 
choice . Hence, the self as a reflective subject is not 
completely detachable and free from i t s s i tuat ion. 
Therefore, the f i r s t and second aspects of the Rawls ian 
self cannot sustain unless they are supplemented with the 
cognitive notion of human agency. 
Common G o o d s a .od S e l f — I d e n t i t y 
1. In last section, I have argued that the self (the 
second meaning of "self") is situated and deeply affected 
by i t s s i tuat ion. Then, how can we infer from this that 
the s e l f ' s situation (which includes common goods) 
constitutes the se l f - ident i ty (the f i r s t meaning of 
"self")? The answer to this question amounts to re j e Qt ing 
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the third aspect of the Rawlsian self that views the se l f -
ident i ty as antecedently individuated . 
Before proceeding to the argument that one's se l f -
ident i ty is constituted by common goods, I have to c lar i fy 
two things . 
First of a l l , I want to recall that the se l f , for 
communitarians , is only a ref lect ive subject . It arises 
(or we are aware of i t ) only when we ref lect on ourselves . 
For Taylor, the self as a ref lec t ive subject is only a 
"bare reflexive awareness
11
 (1991，306) . When one re f lec ts 
on himself, he is at once aware that his self is both the 
subject and the object of his re f lec t ion . According to my 
d i s t i n c t i o n be tween t h e two mean ings of " s e l f " , I would 
call the self-as-subject "the sel f" (that i s , the second 
meaning) of the person while the se1f-as-object his "s e1f -
ident i ty" . As I have shown, se l f - iden t i ty is a l i s t of 
s ignif icant descriptions of one's ends, commitments , 
re la t ions , roles, etc. These descriptions give the depth 
and character of a person so that he is capable of being 
evaluated morally. 
Second, what do I mean by "se1f- ident i ty constituted 
by common goods"? I do no t mean t h a t t h e s e l f - i d e n t i t y of 
an individual is a we-identity. Rather, I conceive one's 
se l f - iden t i ty as a mixture, a complex structure composed 
of the I - ident i ty and the we-identity. The I~identity is 
defined in terms of the moral powers of choice and the 
dearly and deeply held ends, while the we-identity is 
defined in terms of the dearly and deeply held common 
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goods . It may be otherwise put in the following way. The 
I- ident i ty is a collection of descriptions of the 
significant properties of an individual self while the we-
identi ty is a collection of descriptions about the 
significant properties that' one self shares with others . 
T h e r e f o r e , by " s e l f - i d e n t i t y c o n s t i t u t e d by common goods" 
I mean not on ly t h e w e - i d e n t i t y w i t h i n t h e s e l f - i d e n t i t y 
but also the awareness of the se l f - ident i ty as a complex 
s t r u c t u r e of t he I - i d e n t i t y and t he w e - i d e n t i t y . 
2. Liberals would accept the claim that the self is 
situated in and deeply affected by i t s si tuation. 
However, they would que ry that if communi tarians uphold 
that every person is capable of se l f - re f lec t ion , then they 
have to accept the claim that every person must possess 
certain reflective capacities. These capacities are 
indeed what l iberals call the mora 1 powers of choice. If 
so, then the s e 1 f-a s-sub j e c t must be more than a bare 
reflexive awareness . It must be possessing or constituted 
by the reflective capacities . I agree with liberals at 
this point . In fact , I would not reject the second aspect 
of t h e Rawls ian s e l f c o m p l e t e l y . What I c l a im i s o n l y 
that thi s aspect must be supplemented with the cognitive 
n o t i o n of human a g e n c y wh ich s e e s some g i v e ends a r e t h e 
c o n s t i t u e n t s of t h e s e l f (where " c o n s t i t u e n t " d e n o t e s t h e 
relat ively closer distance between the self and i ts ends). 
To ho l d bo th t he second a s p e c t and t h e c o g n i t i v e n o t i o n i s 
not inconsistent . I t is perfectly imaginable thaf the 
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self is constituted by the ref lect ive capacit ies and some 
ends ‘ (either given but unref lec ted or having been 
ref lected and held dearer than before). 
L i b e r a l s w o u l d a r g u e f u r t h e r t h a t t h e s e r e f l e c t i v e 
capacities are the core of the self because they are non-
d e t a c h a b l e w h i l e t h e e n d s c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e s e l f a r e i n 
principle detachable . Therefore , the ref lec t ive 
capacities are nevertheless prior to the consti tut ive 
ends . But I do not agree with them on th is . I t is 
because s e l f - r e f l e c t ion is impossible with only the 
ref lec t ive capacities . As agreed by Kymli cka, in making 
judgement (or ref lec t ion) of our commitments (or tasks) , 
"we must take something as a 'given ' " ( 1989a, 51). It is 
because to re f lec t on one's ends (ei ther prospective or 
actual) is to evaluate their worthiness, to see whether i t 
is good or bad for oneself. One needs cer tain standards 
of evaluation so as to evaluate the worthiness of the 
ends . For example, the Christian housewife needs the 
standards of evaluation, which are in ternal to the 
practice of monogamous marriage, to evaluate her own 
marriage . When she re f l ec t s on the practice of monogamous 
marriage which she once took for granted, she needs some 
other standards of evaluation. Without these standards, 
s e l f - r e f l ec t ion cannot be carried out . I t means that the 
ac t iv i ty of s e l f - r e f l ec t i on must be accomplished with both 
the re f lec t ive capacit ies and the standards of evaluation. 
To put i t d i f f e ren t ly , the ref lec t ive capaci t ies could not 
* •， 
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be realized (in form of the act ivi ty of sel f - ref lect ion) 
if there is no given ends or standards of evaluation. 
Some of the standards of evaluation may be given but 
unreflected by the reflecting agent . We may simply 
inherit them from our cultures or social inst i tut ions . We 
may have reflected on and accepted some of them. Some 
standards may be held as dearer than before while others 
may be held l ightly after reflect ion. In fact , however, 
most of these standards have remained unreflected and not 
voluntarily chosen. No matter these ends are chosen or 
given, reflected or unreflected, they are made use by us 
in se l f - re f lec t ion . And since many of them are given but 
unreflected, we make use of them not out of voluntary 
choice but out of habits. Therefore, we are s t i l l deeply 
affected by some standards of evaluation. 
However, l iberals would object in this way. They may 
accept (1) that the self is situated and deeply affected 
by i t s ends and standards of evaluation ； and (2) that the 
se l f - ident i ty is constituted by the ref lect ive capacities 
and some deeply held ends and standards . Nevertheless, 
they would argue, the se l f - ident i ty is basically an I -
identi ty instead of a we-identity unless communitarians 
could show that some of the deeply held ends or standards 
of evaluation of a person are commonly shared. 
Now, let us see to what extent we always invoke the 
commonly shared standards of evaluation, which orient us 
to pursue the goods of performance the immediately 
common goods . 
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3. We always evaluate different things to see whether 
they are good to be taken or given up . If one evaluates 
the things for himself, his evaluation is se l f - ref lec t ion . 
Let me consider the case of evaluation for others f i r s t . 
To evaluate something or a 'form of l i f e is to talk about 
whether i t is good or bad, worthwhile or worthless to take 
up. Such an evaluation involves at least two things, 
namely, some standards of evaluation and the narrative of 
the l i f e of the person concerned. Imagine that I am 
trying to convince my friend not to count grasses in his 
garden day by day. My evaluation of his activity involves 
one set of standards while his own evaluation involves 
another set of standards . Since we appeal to different 
standards , our evaluations of his counting grasses are 
h i g h l y p r o b a b l y d i f f e r e n t . In o r d e r t o c o n v i n c e him t o 
g i v e up c o u n t i n g g r a s s e s , I must c o n v i n c e him t h a t my 
standards are more appropriate or make more sense than his 
(or that his standards make no sense) . He t r ies to do so 
conversely. To do this , I must invoke the narrative of 
his l i f e . That means, I must t e l l him, for example, that 
he is not a mathematician so that he cannot solve any 
mathematical problem by counting grasses ； or that he is 
not a neurotic person ； or that he never acquires an 
avers ion to. other persons, and so on. By doing so, 
although either I or my friend may appeal to standards 
private to each o the r / both of us must appeal to a third 
«• ' I doubt very much whether it is possible to have any standard 
of evaluation which is private to a person, that is, standards, shared 
by no other person. But for the time being, I suppose it is possible. 
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set of standards . With this third set of standards, we 
may judge whether his standards (and hence his evaluation) 
or mine (and hence my evaluation) make more sense or are 
more appropriate in respect of the narrative of his l i f e . 
This third set of standards must be commonly shared by us 
(they are what Taylor calls "framework" in 1989b)； 
otherwise , our conversation would completely break down 
or, at best, be distorted. 
Going back to the case of se l f - re f lec t ion . Is i t 
possible for me to appeal to my private standards of 
evaluation alone? I doubt rather, for three reasons . 
Firs t , se l f - ref lect ion is an act ivi ty of reason 
giving so as to make sense of one
 1
s choice, l i fe form and 
the evaluation of his ends, etc. As pointed out by-
Taylor , t h e act ivi ty of reason giving or making sense is 
primarily a common activity (1992, 32-3). This is 
because, when we learnt how to give reason in our early 
childhood, something made sense not to me alone but rather 
to me and my parents (or significant others) . I was not 
only taught how to give reasons but also supplied with a 
lot of approved or recognised reasons by my significant 
others . So, seIf-ref lect ion is basically a common 
act iv i ty and my evaluation of myself is required to make 
sense to us, that is , to me and my significant others . 
Secondly, although se l f - ref lec t ion is often carried 
out by oneself, i t is by no means monological action but 
dialogical . When one reflects on himself, he imagines 
that he is talking to a "potential interlocutor" (I borrow 
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this term from Taylor 1989b, 2 9). That means, he is 
trying to convince himself as if he is trying to convince 
the potential interlocutor. The potential interlocutor 
is , like a variable in algebra, replaceable by any actual 
interlocutor. So, sometimes se l f - ref lec t ion may be 
carried out in the dialogue between oneself and his 
friend. For example, a man obsessed with playing TV games 
may turn to his friend to seek advice, to see whether he 
should give i t up or he should play less . Although he is 
giving reasons to himself so that his evaluation of 
himself make s sense to himself, he expects his reasons 
would be accepted by others so as his evaluation of 
himself would make sense to others . In short , when one 
ref lec ts on himself, he wants others to endorse his 
evaluation. Of course, in many cases people find others 
disapprove their evaluations of themselves but none of us 
would expect others to disapprove our evaluations . 
Therefore , se1f — ref1ection is by nature a dialogical 
act ivi ty between oneself and a potential interlocutor . 
Thirdly, not only the evaluation of something (that 
is , the result of self-ref lection) but also the se l f -
ref lection i t se l f need to make sense . For example, the 
person who is obsessed with playing TV games would have no 
idea of reflecting on the matter. What motivates him to 
ref lect on himself? If he is really obsessed with playing 
TV games, that means he holds i t dearly, he would probably 
have never thought of giving i t up or maintaining a 
distance from i t . If so, how would he try to refleot on 
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i t ? Even if a friend of him asks him to think i t over, he 
would probably ask ： "why should I distance my self from 
this end?" This question is a deeper kind of s e l f -
ref lec t ion . One would not perform this kind of s e l f -
r e f l e c t i o n u n l e s s he f i n d s s ome th i ng wrong abou t h i s 
present s i tuat ion. Thus, se l f - re f lec t ion i t se l f needs 
motivation. We need to convince ourselves by ours elves , 
and in most cases by others, to ref lec t on ourselves . 
This invokes standards of evaluation,. other than those 
already used by oneself to evaluate of his present 
s i tuat ion, in order to discover the wrongne s s or 
inappropriateness of his obsession. Again, in order to 
compare t h e e v a l u a t i o n s f a c i l i t a t e d by o n e ' s own s t a n d a r d s 
and other ' s , one needs to invoke a third set of standards 
of evaluation or framework which has already accepted by 
his potential interlocutor . Therefore, we are in turn 
inescapable from some commonly shared standards of 
evaluation . 
To sum up, since evaluation and se l f - re f l ec t ion must 
appeal to certain commonly shared standards of excellence， 
which orient us towards certain immediately common goods, 
we are assuming a we~ident i ty with our fe1low cit izens who 
share those standards with us . 
4 . One would o b j e c t t h e above a r g u m e n t s f o r t h e y i m p l y 
an absurd s i tuat ion. Suppose two confronting or warring 
s ta tes come to negotiate a t rea ty , say, a cease-f i re 
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treaty According to the above arguments, the parties 
i 
are sharing certain standards of evaluation or qualitative 
dist inction which are the implicit norms of the practice 
of negotiation. Both parties know what amounts to an 
appropriate offer or acceptance , for example, in a 
negotiation. These standards of evaluation orient the 
parties to some immediately common goods which may not be 
known or art iculated. The parties
 1
 sharing some standards 
is considered an indicator of their sharing some common 
goods . If so, according to the above arguments , they are 
—-
sharing a we~identity and hence belong to one community. 
But i t is obviously contrary to the fact that the parties 
in the negotiation belong to two confronting or warring 
states . 
The above objection may be replied by pointing out 
that common goods and common action are only the necessary 
conditions of common identi ty. So, s imply having a common 
good would not necessarily imply the having of a common 
ident i ty . However, the objection may further be refined 
so as to remain in force . The confronting parties ' 
part icipation in the negotiation and acting in accordance 
with the standards of evaluation may be interpreted as 
that their common actions to achieve the immediately 
common goods. If so, the confronting parties may be 
understood as sharing a common ident i ty . 
1
 This objection is originally suggested by Dr. Shih YuaiHKuan. 
I have refined his original argument by filling in more details. 
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I thought of two possible replies . Fi rs t , i t is 
I 
possible to conceive the world as a global community. 
Every people on this planet is regarded as a member of i t . 
The parties in the negotiation representing the 
confronting states should share this common identi ty. If 
they do not, they are s imply wrong. This reply is perhaps 
too optimistic and I think i t is not so sat isfactory. 
The second reply is more plausible . To what extent 
are the confronting parties carrying out common actions in 
the negotiation? Surely they appeal to the same set of 
standards to try to reach agreement . Yet, are they 
consciously (or "voluntarily" in l ibe ra l ' s term) knowing 
that these standards do orient them to some common goods ? 
Are they consciously knowing that their acting in 
accordance with those standards amounts to carrying out 
some kinds of common actions? Thus, I reassert the claim 
that communitarians need not to reject al l voluntarist 
elements of the Rawlsian se l f . Otherwise, they would fa l l 
a prey to their own argument and fa i l to reply to the 
above objection. It is because, on the one hand, the 
human agents are capable of choosing voluntarily and must 
rely on the commonly shared standards of evaluation on the 
o-t-her. It means that they are given with some common 
goods, whether known or not, and hence they are given a 
"potential" common identi ty. This potential common 
identi ty will be realized by their common actions . Since 
common actions are dialogical and concerted actions, no 
dialogical and concerted actions can be involuntarily or 
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unconsciously carried out. Back to our confronting 
part ies in the negotiation. Unless they are consciously 
knowing that they are carrying out some common actions to 
obtain some common goods, they are not sharing a common 
ident i ty . The potential common identity, on the other 
hand, cannot be given up because i t is constituted by 
common goods which are constituted by the standards of 
evaluation adopted by individual persons . It is like a 
bank draft pending for i t s holder to cash i t . Yet, i t is 
not anything up to individual persons ' choices whether to 
take or to give up. 
5. I have argued in this chapter, f i r s t l y , that only in 
se l f - ref lec t ion a person is aware of his self-as-subject . 
The subject is constituted by the moral powers of choice 
and some deeply held individual ends . It assumes an I一 
ident i ty . Secondly, only through se l f - ref lec t ion a person 
can discover that his self unavoidably commits to some 
commonly shared standards of evaluation which constitute 
some immediately common goods . It means that the person 
inevitably shares a potential common ‘identity, a we-
ident i ty , with his fellow citizens . Finally, since the 
subject can be discovered only in se l f - ref lec t ion which 
presupposes the commonly shared standards, hence the I-
ident i ty presupposes the we-identi ty. Neither the I -
identi ty nor the we-identity may be discovered without the 
presence of the other. Therefore , none of them takes 
pr ior i ty over the other. , 
106 
My awareness of the interdependence of my I~ident i ty 
and we-identi ty is made possible only when I reflect on 
myself and come to be aware of my commitment in the common 
goods . It is in this sense that my self-ident i ty, .as a 
complex structure composed' of an I~ident i ty and a we-





I ha ve argued in Chapter 1 that Rawls’ idea of pure 
procedural justice does leave a certain room for the idea 
of common good. The idea of pure procedural justice 
requires that the procedure must be f a i r . A fa i r 
procedure depends in turn on a "neutral procedure thesis" 
which requires that the procedure should be independent of 
conceptions of the good. Based on the distinction between 
p e r s o n a l c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e good and common goods , I have 
argued that a pure procedure needs to be independent of 
personal conceptions of the good . And hence i t is 
possible for a pure procedure to incorporate some common 
goods . 
In Chapter 2, I have argued that the possibi l i ty of 
incorporating common goods in a fa i r procedure makes sense 
to us only if there are common goods in modern societies . 
I have rejected some popular views of common good and have 
art iculated the specific meaning of "common good" intended 
by communitarians. Upon this specific meaning, I have 
pointed out that there are certain important kinds of 
common goods. They are, namely, the "mediately" and 
"immediately" common goods . 
* 虞》 
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If there are common goods, then the possibil i ty of 
incorporating them in a pure procedure becomes significant 
to us . I have put forth a stronger argument in Chapter 3 
that common goods are very important for our understanding 
of ourselves . In the f i r s t place, our selves are 
unavoidably situated in and deeply affected by common 
goods . Secondly, our self — identity is constituted, or 
made possible, by common goods . We are aware of our s e l f
-
identity as a complex structure of the we-identity and the 
I 一 identity only if we see ourselves as situated in and 
deeply affected by the common goods . 
Some other problems would probably arise if we really 
incorporate the idea of pure procedural justice with that 
of common good. These include the problem whether the 
procedure takes priori ty over common goods or vice versa 
and the problem concerning conflict between the ideas of 
p lura l is t society and of common good . (I have not dealt 
with these problems here .) However, since there are 
common goods, and they are so important for our se l f -
understanding, the possibi l i ty of incorporating them in a 
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